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PREFACE
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (Public Law 91-596), states that 
the purpose of Congress expressed in the Act is "to assure so far as possible every 
working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions and to 
preserve our human resources...by," among other things, "providing for research in 
the field of occupational safety and health...and by developing innovative methods, 
techniques, and approaches for dealing with occupational safety and health 
problems." Later in the Act the National Institute for Occupational Safety and 
Health (Centers for Disease Control, Atlanta, Georgia) is charged with carrying out 
this policy. A principle means by which this information is communicated, is 
through the publication by NIOSH of Technical Guidelines.
Technical Guidelines are published for the purpose of disseminating 
comprehensive information about occupational hazards so that these hazards may be 
reduced in order to prevent injury and disease among workers. Technical Guidelines 
focus attention on occupational exposures which, though previously recognized, have 
never before been subjected to systematic and comprehensive analysis. Technical 
Guidelines present recommendations for reducing the hazards by a variety of means 
including compliance with any existing pertinent regulations. The Guidelines may 
also be used to support development of Federal safety and health standards.
Technical Guidelines are distributed to representatives of organized labor, 
industry, public health agencies, academic institutions, and public interest 
groups, as well as to those Federal agencies, such as the Department of Labor, 
which have responsibilities for protecting the safety and health of workers. It is 
our intention that anyone with the need to know should have ready access to the 
information contained in these documents; we welcome suggestions concerning the 
content, style, and distribution of them.
This document provides guidance for protecting workers in grain elevators and 
feed mills. It was prepared by the staff of the Division of Safety Research,
NIOSH, (944 Chestnut Ridge Road, Morgantown, WV, 26505), in conjunction with the 
Division of Standards Development and Technology Transfer, NIOSH (Robert A. Taft 
Laboratories, 4676 Columbia Parkway, Cincinnati, OH, 45226). I am pleased to 
acknowledge the many contributions to this document made by consultants; reviewers 
selected by the National Grain and Feed Association (NFGA), the American Feed 
Manufacturers Association (AFMA), the Grain Elevator and Processing Society 
(GEAPS), the Rice Millers' Association (RMA), the American Federation of Grain 
Millers (AFGM); and the Allied Industrial Workers of America (AIWA); other 
reviewers; representatives of other Federal agencies; and, of course, the staff of 
the Institute (a list of consultants reviewing the document appears on v).
However, responsibility for the conclusions reached and recommendations made 
belongs solely to the Institute. All comments by reviewers, whether or
not incorporated into the final version, are being 
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ABSTRACT
This report presents the results of an investigation of worker safety in grain 
elevators and feed mills. The investigation was conducted in order to develop 
safe work practices and engineering controls which could be used to reduce the 
numtrer of accidents and injuries in the workplace and to train workers in the 
identification and awareness of hazards and their controls.
A description of grain elevators and feed mills is included along with statis­
tical data correlating accidents with the population at risk. Specific haz­
ards associated with combustible dust are addressed, as well as other safety 
hazards which may be encountered in the industry.
Guidelines are included for training, use of personal protective equipment, 
control of combustible dust, control of ignition sources, emergency planning, 
bin entry, isolation and lockouts, machine guarding, safe use of equipment and 
tools, and other work practices which could reduce worker exposure to occupa­
tional safety hazards.
Existing national and international standards are reviewed and compared with 
the developed guidelines. Recommendations for research are provided.
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I. INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE
This report contains safe work practices and engineering controls which were 
developed to reduce worker exposure to safety hazards in grain elevators and 
feed mills. Workers may be exposed to hazards as the result of lack of knowl­
edge of the potential problems, inadequate training, or lack of implementation 
of hazard controls. Workers are exposed to safety hazards associated with 
fires and dust explosions, as well as other general safety hazards associated 
with the daily handling, storage, and processing of grain. Workers may also 
be subjected to health hazards as the result of exposures to grain dust and 
pesticides. Primarily, this report addresses safety hazards. Health hazards 
are discussed only to acknowledge their existence and the need for their con­
trol.
After evaluation of available data, guidelines have been developed to provide 
for the safety of workers. The data base consists of information obtained 
from literature searches, facility visits, and consultation with knowledgeable 
individuals from industry, labor, government, and the academic community.
The guidelines are intended to cover all facilities classified as grain eleva­
tors or feed mills. Although it is recognized that some grain facilities,
such as rice mills, are less susceptible to dust explosions, no attempt has 
been made to correlate the recommended guidelines with the relative hazard of
the commodity being handled. In general, all commodities should be consid­
ered hazardous unless it can be demonstrated otherwise through scientific
means or statistically. The majority of grain elevators and feed mills are 
included in Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Codes 5153 and 2048; 
however, they may be coded otherwise in multibased establishments. The guide­
lines are intended primarily to reduce the number of accidents and injuries in 
existing facilities. The recommendations are broad-based, to accommodate 
variations between facilities and the wide range of operations and processes 
encountered, and are performance oriented wherever possible. Many of the 
recommendations, such as those addressing the use of protective equipment and 
ladders, are consistent with the OSHA General Industry Standards contained in 
29 CFR 1910. Other recommendations, such as those concerning dust control and 
confined space entry, are addressed only generally in OSHA standards or not at 
all. The recommendations are not intended to inhibit flexibility or to
restrict development of safer procedures or techniques. Instead, they should 
enable management and labor to develop better work practices and more 
appropriate training programs that will result in safer work environments. 
Simply complying with the recommended guidelines should not be the final goal.
In spite of current efforts by government, industry, and labor, awareness of 
hazardous conditions in grain-handling and grain-processing facilities is far 
from universal. This report should be of value to both management and workers 
as an aid in identifying hazardous conditions, implementing hazard controls, 
and developing effective training programs.
Supporting information on the prevention of grain elevator and feed mill
explosions can be obtained from the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report,
"Prevention of Grain Elevator and Mill Explosions," NMAB 367-2, which was 
jointly funded by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH), the Occupational Safety ana Health Administration (OSHA), and the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). The systems approach was used in the
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NAS report to identify grain elevator explosion hazards and develop 
recommendations for preventive actions. Additional construction and design 
techniques that should be considered when building new facilities or
renovating existing facilities are contained in National Fire Protection
Association (NFPA) Standards 61B-1980, "Standard for the Prevention of Fires 
and Explosions in Grain Elevators and Facilities Handling Bulk Raw 
Agricultural Commodities," and 61C-1973, "Standard for the Prevention of Fire 
and Dust Explosions in Feed Mills."
Safety precautions related to the use of fumigants in grain-handling
facilities are included in NFPA 61B-1980, "Standard for the Prevention of 
Fires and Explosions in Grain Elevators and Facilities Handling Bulk Raw
Agricultural Commodities."
This report also identifies areas, such as dust control, bucket elevators, 
explosion venting, and fire extinguishing methods, where additional research 
is necessary and provides recommendations for this research.
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II. DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM
A. INTRODUCTION
There are approximately 15,000 grain-handling and grain-processing facilities 
in the United States [1, 2]. These facilities include grain elevators, feed 
mills, and other grain-processing plants. Many are multiuse facilities and 
may be included in more than one classification.
Fires and explosions in these facilities have been reported in this country 
and abroad for almost 200 years. This danger is ever-present in the industry 
because of the physical characteristics of organic dust that is generated 
while handling and processing grains. Also, workers are exposed daily to a 
wide variety of other work-related hazards that are capable of causing bodily 
injury, illness, and death.
This section describes grain elevators and feed mills and provides data corre­
lating accidents with the population at risk. Overall injury statistics are 
presented along with data defining the number, causes, and locations of fire 
and explosion incidents.
B. INDUSTRY DESCRIPTION
Grain elevators are establishments which provide storage space and serve as 
collection and transfer points for grain and beans. Auxiliary operations such 
as sampling, weighing, blending, drying, cleaning, and fumigating may be per­
formed. Feed mills are establishments engaged in the manufacture of feeds for 
animals. A description of grain elevators and feed mills along with asso­
ciated operations is presented below.
1. Grain Elevators
Grain elevators may be classified as country elevators, inland terminals, or 
export terminals [1]. Country elevators receive grain from farms for future 
delivery to a terminal grain elevator or grain processor. Storage capacities 
vary widely; however, country elevators typically have capacities of 100,000 
to 1,000,000 bushels. Inland terminals receive grain from farms and country 
elevators for direct export or delivery to grain processors or export 
terminals. Inland terminals and export terminals are normally the largest 
facilities, reaching capacities of over 10,000,000 bushels. Export terminals 
have the highest grain-handling rates and are generally located at major trade 
or export centers.
There were 9,472 country elevators, 413 inland terminals, and 82 export 
terminals in operation in the United States during 1977-78 [3]. On the 
average, from 2 to 4 people are employed in small country elevators and 40 to 
50 in the terminals [4]. Grain elevators may operate year-round or 
seasonally, with great fluctuations in the work force. Multishift operation 
is common during peak periods. In addition to personnel employed by the grain 
elevator, workers may include grain inspectors, maintenance and construction 
crews, truck drivers, and longshoremen. An estimate of approximately 63,000 
total workers for grain elevators can be arrived at by using an average of 4 
workers for country elevators and 50 workers for terminals.
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This estimate compares well with the Bureau of Census's "1977 Census of 
Wholesale Trade" which reports 70,059 workers (production and support staff) 
for the grain elevator industry [5]. There are three general types of grain 
elevator construction: concrete, steel frame, and wood frame. The newer
establishments are usually constructed of reinforced concrete or steel frames 
sheathed with steel, although in some parts of the Northwest, wood is still 
used for small elevator construction. Older establishments may be wood frame 
structures, sometimes sheathed with steel [6].
Typically, there are two sections of a grain elevator: the storage bins and
the workhouse. Storage bins are usually built in the form of hollow, cylin­
drical towers also called silos. The workhouse contains several levels where 
equipment for receiving, elevating, weighing, cleaning, and distributing grain 
is located. It also contains bins for holding, shipping, and mixing pur­
poses. The height of the workhouse can reach 250 feet and is generally 40 to 
60 feet higher than the storage bins. The additional height minimizes the 
amount of mechanical transfer when moving grain, and provides the space needed 
for the handling equipment. The terms "workhouse" and "headhouse" are usually 
interchangeable, although sometimes that portion of the workhouse that extends 
above the bins is called the headhouse because the head pulleys of the bucket 
elevators are located there. In some facilities, elevating and distributing 
equipment may be freestanding, eliminating the need for a workhouse . A gal­
lery usually covers the bin floor area and extends the length of the bins. 
Enclosed conveyors or gravity spouts from the workhouse to the bins may elimi­
nate the need for this structure. A tunnel, which contains grain-conveying 
equipment, is usually located at the bottom of the bins and extends the length 
of the bin area. A typical terminal type grain elevator is shown sche­
matically in Figure 1.
Grain-handling operations are similar at all grain elevators; however, storage 
capacities, handling speeds, equipment types, and specific operations may 
differ extensively. Incoming grain may be received by truck, rail, or barge. 
Most large facilities have hydraulic truck lift platforms. Hopper-bottom and 
self-dumping trucks are also common. Rail receiving may be by hopper or box 
cars. Box cars may be processed by hydraulic unloaders, which lift and tilt 
the cars, or by front-end loaders or power shovels. Rail cars may be moved by 
rail engines, other powered vehicles, or winches. Barges are usually unloaded 
with movable marine bucket elevators. Final barge cleanout may be by front-end 
loaders, power shovels, or vacuum systems.
Incoming grain inspection is usually accomplished by manually driving long 
probes into the grain before the grain is unloaded. Unless a platform is pro­
vided, personnel must climb onto or into the vehicle to obtain samples. Sam­
pling is accomplished mechanically in some facilities. Internal hopper scales 
are used for weighing grain although platform scales are frequently located in 
the truck receiving areas.
Grain movement throughout the grain elevator is accomplished primarily by bulk 
conveyors, bucket elevators, and the associated gravity spouts and distribu­
tors. Conveyor types, in order of use, include continuous belt and drag and 
screw conveyors. Drag and screw conveyors are normally enclosed.
Drying may be required if the grain has a high moisture content. Usually, 
continuous-flow column dryers are used, but batch dryers are also used.
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Figure 1. Diagrammatic section view of a terminal type grain elevator.
Circled numbers indicate points at which dust clouds are likely to 
be emitted [6].
Cleaning may be required to achieve desired grade levels. Cleaning is normal­
ly accomplished with simple screening machinery that may be shaken, rotated, 
or slanted such that grain will flow across the surface.
Dust-collection systems are provided in many grain elevators. Dust pickup is 
provided at selected locations of high grain turbulence and dust dispersal 
such as receiving dumps and grain transfer points. Dust is pneumatically con­
veyed to collection devices, usually bag filters. Cyclone collectors have
been used extensively in the past, but currently are used much less because of
clean air laws which limit discharge of dust into the outside air. Dust may 
be returned to the grain stream or stored for subsequent shipment from the 
facility. Anderson and Foley [7] reported that of the dust separated from the 
grain stream in elevators, 41.0% was added back to the grain stream, 33.9% was 
sold or given to users, 17.6% was sent to landfills, 3.7% was exhausted to the
air, 3.1% was added to screenings, 0.3% was mixed with reground oat hulls,
0.3% was mixed with corncobs, and 0.1% was collected by a mist of water and 
discharged into a ditch. In 55.8% of the elevators where dust was added back 
to the grain stream, the dust was returned to the grain stream at the elevator 
leg. Frequent housekeeping is usually required to prevent excessive accumula­
tion of dust even when a dust-collection system is used. Housekeeping is 
usually accomplished with brooms, although vacuum systems are also used.
2. Feed Mills N
Feed milling is primarily a grinding and mixing process in which various
grains and grain byproducts are blended with protein concentrates, food
industry byproducts, vitamins, drugs, and minerals. In a study conducted in 
1975 and reported in 1978, the U.S. Department of Agriculture cited 6,340 
feed-manufacturing facilities producing over 100,000,000 tons of feed per 
year. This figure included 4,454 facilities with outputs less than 10,000 
tons per year, 1,329 facilities with outputs between 10,000 and 50,000 tons 
per year, and 556 facilities with outputs of over 50,000 tons per year [8]. 
There was an estimated average of 57,500 workers in the feed mill industry 
(1975-1980) (Table 1).
Incoming grain is generally received by truck or rail, or in some cases, from 
an adjacent grain elevator. Receiving operations in mills are very similar to 
those in grain elevators. However, receiving areas tend to be smaller, are 
less likely to have facilities such as truck dump platforms, and generally
have much lower handling rate capacities.
Grain and feed handling is accomplished by bulk conveyors and bucket eleva­
tors. Systems are generally much smaller and slower than those in grain 
elevators. Drag and screw conveyors are used more extensively and some 
ingredients may be transferred pneumatically. Grain and major feed ingredi­
ents are stored in bins which are generally concrete silos or steel tanks. 
Other ingredients, such as vitamins, minerals, and drugs, may be stored in
bags or barrels. Liquids, such as fats and molasses, are stored in tanks that
are frequently below the floor away from the main processing area.
Whole grain is ground prior to mixing. Hammer mills, roller mills, or other 
types of grinders may be used to reduce the grain to the desired size. Grain,
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liquids, and other ingredients are measured or weighed and blended in mixers. 
Mixers generally contain helical ribbons or paddles attached to a horizontal 
or a vertical shaft.
Some feed ingredients, especially grains, are routed through cleaning equip­
ment prior to grinding or mixing. Scalpers, which are cleaning machines with 
various size screens, are frequently used to remove large oversize trash. 
Also, scalpers may be used to separate feed into uniform sizes. Feed may be 
pelletized by extruding steamed feed through dies of the desired size. Pel­
lets are usually air-cooled after extrusion. A crumbier, or roller mill, may 
also be used to obtain the desired consistency. Pellets are passed between 
rollers which are adjustable to obtain the proper spacing.
Dust-control equipment may be provided in areas of high dust generation, such 
as receiving areas. Dust generation tends to be much less in feed mills than
in grain elevators because of slower grain transfer speeds, less grain
handled, and the tendency to use enclosed conveyors. Dust-control equipment 
may also be provided in locations such as the bagging, grinding, and mixing 
areas.
Feed may be shipped in bulk or bags. Bagging is frequently a semiautomatic 
process where a set amount of feed is released from a holding bin into a bag 
which is positioned by an operator. The bag is then sewed shut and routed to 
the warehouse area. Storage and shipping of bagged grain usually takes place
in a warehouse adjacent to the feed-processing area. Bags may be handled
manually and/or stored on pallets. Pallets may be transported by lift trucks 
or hand trucks.
C. INJURY STATISTICS
1. Injury Incidence Rates
The number and severity of injuries in grain elevators and feed mills may be 
estimated from information reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), 
U.S. Department of Labor [9-14]. Table 1 shows average annual employment and 
incidence rates (per 100 full-time workers) from 1975 through 1980 for total 
injury cases, lost workday cases, nonfatal cases without lost workdays, and 
lost workdays. For comparison, average incidence and lost workday rates are 
shown for specific industries (SIC Codes 204, Grain Mill Products; 2048, 
Prepared Feeds; and 515, Farm Product Raw Materials) as well as for all 
private sector industries combined. These data show a total of approximately 
8,500 annual injuries (employment times total case incidence rate divided by 
100) in feed mill establishments. Feed mills had an average injury incidence 
rate of 14.8 and an average lost workday incidence rate (severity rate) of 
112.3, which are respectively 1.7 and 1.9 times the average rates exhibited by 
total industry.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics does not report data for the four-digit SIC 
code 5153 which includes grain elevators. The three-digit SIC code 515, Farm 
Product Raw Materials, includes other industries in addition to grain 
elevators.
Currently, occupational accident and injury information from participating 
states, derived from employers' first report of injury forms, is compiled and 
reported by the BLS Supplementary Data System (SDS) [15]. Of the states which
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Average Occupational Injury Incidence Rates for 
Selected Industries, 1975 - 1980
Table 1









Nonfatal Cases Lost 
w/o Lost Workdays Workdays
All 69,513.7 8.9 3.7 5.2 60.7
Grain Mill Prod­
ucts (SIC 204) 141.3 14.9 6.7 8.2 118.3
Prepared Feeds 
(SIC 2048) 57.5 14.8 6. 7 8.1 112.3
Farm Product Raw 
Materials (SIC 515) 138.8 8.9 4.3 4.6 67.1
Reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor [9-14]. 
Note: Data for 1977 - 1979 were not reported for SIC 515, and employment for
SIC 515 was reported for 1976 only.
report SIC 5153 and 2048 injury data to SDS, a total of 18 states also 
reported average grain-handling activity for the years 1977-1980 (Table 2). 
The proportion of total grain-handling activity based on average off-farm 
storage facilities, off-farm storage capacities, and total crop production 
(1977-1980) for these states, as a percentage of national figures, was 45.7%, 
43.0%, and 52.2% respectively. Table 2 contains the SDS injury data, reported 
between 1977 and 1980, for the states that reported both injury statistics for 
Grain Elevators (SIC 5153) and Feed Mills (SIC 2048) and data on off-farm 
storage facilities, off-farm storage capacities, and total crop production 
[1,16,17].
Additional information on grain elevators and grain mills is included in the 
1977 edition of "Accident Facts" prepared by the National Safety Council (NSC) 
[18]. This edition records the results of a 3-year study performed on the 
basis of reports to the NSC. Table 3 includes injury frequency rates and 
severity rates per 1,000,000 hours for grain mills and grain elevators for the 
3-year period from 1974 through 1976. The rates are not directly comparable 
to the BLS data since: (1) The NSC base of 1,000,000 hours corresponds to 500 
full-time workers rather than 100 full-time workers, (2) the NSC data include 
only disabling work injuries while the BLS data include total injuries, and 
(3) NSC and BLS accident reporting requirements differed during the 3-year 
period. The data presented by the NSC over the 3-year period are most 
important when compared with the overall industry rates. For grain mills
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Table 2
Grain Elevators (SIC 5153) and Feed Mills (SIC 2048) Injury 
Distribution and Grain-Handling Activity in 
SDS Reporting States for 1977-1980*
State^
Injuries per 
SIC 2048 SIC 5153
year









Arkansas (3) 83.0 3.7 86.7 271.0 203,157 255,720
Colorado (4) 46.0 67.0 113.0 202.3 93,040 162,993
Delaware (4) 4.8 1.3 6.0 27.8 17,573 25,824
Idaho (4) 140.3 189.5 329.8 235.0 68,405 137,059
Iowa (4) 126.5 137.8 266.8 1,136.0 651,388 1,819,755
Kentucky (4) 67.5 39.0 106.0 204.3 49,228 171,792
Michigan (4) 23.3 43.8 67.0 366.8 92,008 241,463
Minnesota (4) 108.0 236.3 319.3 892.5 377,425 1,034,433
Missouri (4) 459.8 206.5 666.3 613.3 210,908 447,327
Montana (4) 111.3 136.3 247.5 291.5 52,743 213,393
Nebraska (4) 503.5 531.5 1,030.5 733.3 498,440 1,024,759
New York (3) 69.3 9.3 80.3 239.3 66,437 68,930
Oregon (4) 50.8 39.5 90.3 237.0 65,075 66,785
South Dakota (3) 59.0 247.7 306.7 387.0 84,270 400,505
Tennessee (4) 64.8 8.9 73.5 138.8 49,148 110,959
Utah (4) 39.5 16.5 56.0 58.3 17,288 14,951
Washington (3) 71.0 237.0 308.0 323.3 189,170 168,468
Wisconsin (4) 128.8 23.0 151.8 579.0 125,023 342,340
Total 2,157.2 2,174.6 4,035.5 6,936.5 2,910,726 6,707,456
National Total 15,171 6,762,807 12,856,760
X  of National 45.7 43.0 52.2
1 Compiled from BLS, Supplementary Data System [17] and data from U.S. Department of Agriculture [16].
2 Number of years reporting (3 or 4).
3 Reported for 1978 only.
(corresponding to the three-digit SIC code 204), the frequency rate of 
disabling injuries is approximately 1.7 times higher than the industry 
average, with the severity rate approximately 2.1 times higher than the 
industry average. For grain elevators (corresponding to the four-digit SIC 
code 5153), the frequency rate is approximately 1.5 times higher than the 
industry average; however, the severity rate is approximately 5.8 times as 
high. Comparable records more recent than 1976 are not available.
Also of interest are data included in Table 4, which address occupational
injury and illness rates by employment size. For Grain Mill Products, the 
lowest incidence rates are achieved by employers with over 1,000 or less than 
20 personnel. For Farm Products Raw Materials, a similar trend exists, with 
the lowest rates achieved by those companies employing the most and least
number of workers.
2. General Accident Statistics
The purpose of the SDS system is to report occupational accident/injury 
information in sufficient detail to alert users to patterns and relationships 
of injury causal factors. Information from the workers' compensation first
report of injury forms is entered into each of four major groupings [15]:
o Source of injury
o Type of accident
o Nature of injury
o Part of body affected.
Tables 5 and b summarize the SDS accident/injury data for teed mills and grain 
elevators.
The information presented in Tables 5 and 6 is sufficient to detail the most 
prevalent natures of injuries incurred in feed mills (sprains and strains, 
32.8%; cuts, 16.1%; and contusions, 14.5%) and the most common parts of the 
body injured (back 20.1%; fingers, 12.8%; and eyes, 7.4%). This information 
also details the most prevalent natures of injuries incurred in grain 
elevators (sprains and strains, 27.5%; cuts, 16.2%; and contusions, 13.7%) and 
the most common parts of the body injured (back, 17.8%; fingers, 11.1%; and 
eyes, 7.4%). However, the depth of analysis offered is insufficient for the 
purposes of defining actual accident causal factors beyond the quantification 
of incidents associated within the broad injury source categories (working 
surfaces, metal items, boxes, etc.).
3. Supplementary Data System - Accident/Injury Analysis
The SDS differentiates the major "source of injury" categories into nearly 300 
subcategories [15]. These categories are representative of tools and/or 
equipment used in all varieties of manufacturing processes in all types of 
industries. In many instances, the "source of injury" categories are still 
not useful for the purposes of quantifying accidents specific to grain 
elevator and feed mill industries. An additional constraint in the 
applicability of the data base is that some of the tools and equipment used in 






DISABLING WORK INJURIES 




PER 1,000,000 HOURS 
1974 TO 1976
All 10.87 668
Grain Mills 18.70 1,389
Grain Elevators 16.64 3,902
Reported by the National Safety Council [18]*
Table 4
Occupational Injury and Illness Incidence Rates, 
Private Sector, By Industry and Employment Size, 
United States, 1976
INDUSTRY AND EMPLOYMENT SIZE
SIC
CODE
MEAN INCIDENCE RATE 
PER 100 FULL-TIME WORKERS
Grain Mill Products 204
All Sizes 15.4
1 to 19 9.8
20 to 49 18.4
50 to 99 17.5
100 to 249 20.1
250 to 499 16.5
500 to 999 14.8
1,000 to 2,499 4.8
Farm Product Raw Materials 515
All Sizes 9.7
1 to 19 7.7
20 to 49 9.4
50 to 99 15.2
100 to 249 13.9
250 to 499 9.7
500 to 999 7. 7
Reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor [10].
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Table 5
Summary of SDS Accident/Injury Profile, 1976-1979, 





Source of Injury Type of Accident
Boxes, barrels, containers 1580 15.4 Overexertion 2162 21.2
Working surfaces 1433 14.0 Struck by 2063 20.2
Metal items 1114 10.9 Struck against 1064 10.4
Vehicles 1060 10.4 Fall from elevation 903 8.8
Bodily motion 600 5.9 Caught in, under, or between 874 8.6
Machines 582 5.7 Fall on same level 852 8.3
Handtools, not powered 511 5.0 Bodily reaction 646 6.3
Buildings and structures 241 2.3 Rubbed or abraded 492 4.8
Wood items 234 2.3 Contact with caustics 379 3.7
Particles 211 2.1 Motor vehicle accidents 239 2.3
All other classifiable 2299 22.5 All other classifiable 333 3.3
Nonelassifiable 361 3.5 Nonelassifiable 219 2.1
fO
Nature of Injury 
Sprains, strains 3351 32.8
Part of Body Injured 
Back 2051 20.1
Cut 1647 16.1 Finger(s) 1313 12.8
Contusion 1487 14.5 Eye(s ) 755 7.4
Fracture 869 8.5 Hand 529 5.2
Scratches 464 4.5 Multiple parts 529 5.2
Burn (heat) 217 2.1 Foot (not ankle or toes) 482 4.7
Dislocation 191 1.9 Ankle 421 4.1
Hernia 152 1.5 Knee 418 4.1
Multiple injuries 137 1.3 Wrist 318 3.1
Amputation 119 1.2 Chest 317 3.1
All other classifiable 977 9.6 All other classifiable 2993 29.2
Nonclass ifiable 615 6.0 Nonelassifiable 100 1.0
Compiled from Bureau of Labor Statistics' Supplementary Data System [17].
Table 6
Summary of SDS Accident/Injury Profile, 1976-1979, 





Source of Injury Type of Accident
Working surfaces 1237 16.6 Struck by 1528 20.5
Metal items 994 13.3 Overexertion 1209 16.2
Boxes, barrels, containers 720 9.7 Fall from elevation 831 11.1
Vehicles 712 9.6 Struck against 796 10.7
Bodily motion 460 6.2 Caught in, under, or between 671 9.0
Handtools, not powered 403 5.4 Fall on same level 656 8.8
Machines 360 4.8 Bodily reaction 496 6.6
Wood items
Chemicals and chemical
235 3.2 Contact with caustics 335 4.5
compounds 197 2.6 Rubbed or abraded 326 4.4
Buildings and structures 187 2.5 Motor vehicle accidents 166 2.2
All other classifiable 1709 22.9 All other classifiable 273 3.7
Nonclassifiable 241 3.2 Nonclassifiable 168 2.3
Nature of Injury 
Sprains, strains 2047 27.5
Part of Body Injured 
Back 1329 17.8
Cut 1210 16.2 Finger(s) 826 11.1
Contusion 1021 13.7 Eye(s) 550 7.4
Fracture 857 11.5 Multiple Parts 448 6.0
Scratches 374 5.0 Foot (not ankle or toes) 397 5.3
Dislocation 189 2.5 Hand 375 5.0
Multiple injuries 155 2.1 Ankle 343 4.6
Hernia 150 2.0 Knee 314 4.2
Burn (chemical) 120 1.6 Chest 265 3.6
Burn (heat) 97 1.3 Shoulder 196 2.6
All other classifiable 739 9.9 All other classifiable 2324 31.2
Nonelassifiable 496 6.7 Nonclass ifiable 88 1.2
Compiled from Bureau of Labor Statistics' Supplementary Data System [17].
hammer mills, grain dryers, bucket elevators, and scalpers) and are not 
individually categorized. Accident and injury data from these specific 
sources are frequently grouped by the SDS into categories such as "Not 
Elsewhere Classified."
A further difficulty encountered in the data base, when using it for analysis 
of accident causal factors, is that, by definition, the "source of injury" is 
the object identified as most responsible for causing the injury. This may, 
in fact, not be directly associated with the actual cause of the accident. 
For example, if a worker cuts his finger while using a saw, the "source of 
injury" is the saw, which also is the tool most clearly associated with the 
accident causal factor. However, if a worker falls from a ladder and 
fractures his leg on the floor of the facility, the "source of injury" is the 
floor, which probably contributed very little to the actual cause of the 
accident.
However, once the data constraints of the SDS reporting system are recognized, 
the information included can be applied to further identify some of the 
hazards associated with tasks, tools, and equipment used in grain elevators 
and feed mills. A computer analysis was performed on the four classifications 
of information reported to the SDS in 1976 - 1979. In the cross analysis, the 
"source of injury" was cross-tabulated with the "type of accident", "nature of 
injury", and "body part."
The analysis of the SDS acc ident/in jury data was performed for 39 "source of 
injury" categories that identified tools/tasks/equipment used in feed mill 
operations and for 38 "source of injury" categories in grain elevator
operations. A total of 10,226 injuries were reported to the SDS data base 
from the feed mill industry in 1976 - 1979; 7,370 were included in the cross 
analysis. A total of 7,455 injuries were reported to the SDS data base from 
the grain elevator industry in 1976 - 1979; 5,266 were included in the cross 
analysis. The remaining cases fell into categories that were not related to 
the industry, categories too general to be beneficial to the accident 
analysis, or "source" categories that were numerically/statistically 
insignificant. The results of the cross analysis of the SDS data are
summarized in Tables 7 and 8. The total number of accidents/injuries appears 
in the "Source of Injuries" column. The numbers that define the "Type of 
Accident", "Nature of Injury", and "Body Part Injured" are the most frequent 
subcategories in each major heading and are not expected to total with the 
"Source of Injury" number. This information does not define actual accident
causal factors; rather, it demonstrates relationships between tools and 
equipment used in grain elevator and feed mill operations and general accident 
and injury classifications.
D. FIRE AND EXPLOSION STATISTICS
The threat of dust fires and explosions and the corresponding severity of 
injuries and damage prompts the greatest safety concern in grain-handling and 
grain-processing facilities. Of all the industrial dust explosions in the
United States, those in grain elevators are the most frequent and cause the 
most injuries and property damage [61. According to Theimer [19J, the 
National Fire Protection Association stated about 48 percent of the total 
number of dust explosions in the United States during the period from 1900 to
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Table 7
Summary of Cross-Analysis Tabulation of SDS Accident/Injury Profile, 1976-1979,
for the Feed Mill Industry (SIC 2048)
Source of Injury Number Type of Accident Number Nature of Injury Number Body Part Injured Number
Boxes, Barrels, 
Containers, Packages








Sprains, strains 780 Back 600
Boxes, crates, 
Cartons
14 7 Overexertion in 
lifting objects 









Barrels, keys, drums 118 Overexert ion in 
lifting objects 


















99 Overexert ion in 
lifting objects




Bundles, bales 97 Overexert ion in 
lifting objects 










Tanks, bins 87 Struck against 
stationary object 



















Working surfaces, N 
Stairs, steps
478 Fall to the walkway 210 Sprains, strains 179 Back
Fall from ladders 69 Contusion 110 Knee
Fall to lower level, N 60 Fracture 93 Ankle
Fall on same level 29 Multiple
Fall on stairs 23
445 Fall from vehicles 132 Sprains, strains 184 Back
Fall to the walkway 95 Fracture 80 Ankle
Fall to lower level, N 58 Contusion 76 Multiple
Wrist
170 Fall to the walkway 73 Sprains, strains 73 Knee
Contusion 32 Ba ck
Ankle
15 7 Fall to the walkway 46 Sprains, strains 62 Back
Fall from vehicles 29 Contusion 35 Ankle


















Summary of Cross-Analysis Tabulation of SDS Accident/Injury Profile, 1976-1979,
for the Feed Mill Industry (SIC 2048) (Continued)
Source of Injury Number Type of Accident Number Nature of Injury Number Body Part Injured Number
Metal Items
Metal items, N 543 Struck by, N 




















Metal items 259 Struck against sta- 
tionary object 
Rubbed by foreign 









Pipe 92 Struck by falling 
object

























Nails, spikes 61 Struck against sta­
tionary object
43 Cut 58 Foot 42
Vehicles













Handtrucks 259 Struck by, N 















Forklift 144 Struck by, N 
Caught in, under, or 








































Summary of Cross-Analysis Tabulation of SDS Accident/Injury Profile, 1976-1979,
for the Feed Mill Industry (SIC 2048) (Continued)




Handtoola, not powered, N 69
















Bodily reaction by 298
involuntary motiona 
Bodily reaction by 217
voluntary motiona
Struck by, N 165
Struck by, N 27
Struck by, N 36
Overexertion in 20
holding
Struck by, N 28
Caught in, under, or 50 
between
Struck against ata- 41
tionary object 
Caught in, under, or 25
between in-running or 
me8hing objecta
Struck against ata- 18
tionary object 
Struck by, N 8
Caught in, under, or 7
between, N
Rubbed by foreign 157
matter in eyes
Struck by, N 16
Overexertion in 11
lifting objects



















































































Summary of Cross-Analysis Tabulation of SDS Accident/Injury Profile, 1976-1979,
for the Feed Mill Industry (SIC 2046) (Continued)
Source of Injury Number Type of Accident Number Nature of Injury Number Body Part Injured Numb
Conveyors
Powered conveyors 137 Caught in, under or 
between, N 
Caught in, under, or 
between in-running 


















Conveyors 56 Struck against sta­
tionary object 










Doors, gates 123 Caught in, under or 
between, N 
















Buildings and structures, N 57 Struck against sta­
tionary object 














Chemicals and Chemical 
Compounds, N
143 Contact by absorption 
Contact by inhalation 















Grains and Grain Products 69 Overexertion in 22 Sprains, strains 24 Eye(s) 17
lifting objects 




Scratches 12 Back 17
Flame, Fire, Smoke 67 Contact with hot 








3 Compiled from Bureau of Labor Statistics' Supplementary Data System [17].
) Note: N = Not Elsewhere Classified
Table 8
Summary of Cross-Analysi6 Tabulation of SDS Accident/Injury Profile, 1976-1979,
for the Grain Elevator Industry (SIC 5153)
Source of Injury Number Type of Accident Number Nature of Injury Number Body Part Injured Number
Working Surfaces
Ground 485 Fall from vehicles 155 Sprains, strains 184 Ba ck 116
Fall to the walkway 85 Fracture 104 Ankle 76
Fall on same level, N 54 Knee 40
Floor 279 Fall to the walkway 76 Sprains, strains 99 Back 60
Fall from ladders 47 Fracture 59 Ankle 26
Fall to lower level,, N 33 Contusion 55 Multiple parts 22
Working surfaces, N 224 Fall to the walkway 54 Sprains, strains 66 Back 39
Fall to lower level,, N 39 Contusion 51 Ankle 38
Fracture 48 Foot 21
Working surfaces 129 Fall to the walkway 52 Sprains, strains 55 Multiple parts 22
Contusion 28 Back 19
Fracture 27
Stairs, steps 52 Fall on stairs 33 Sprains, strains 15 Mouth 9
Contusion 14 Ba ck 7
Ankle 5
Metal Items
Metal items, N 494 Struck by, N 116 Cut 224 Finger(s) 109
Struck against sta­ 72 Scratches 72 Eye(s) 87
tionary object Fracture 59 Hand 43
Struck by falling 67 Contusion 54
object
Metal items 173 Struck against sta­ 28 Cut 71 Finger(s) 28
tionary object Fracture 24 Eye(s) 26
Struck by falling 25 Contusion 21 Hand 17
object Sprains, strains 20
Struck by 25 Scratches 9
Nails, spikes 117 Struck against sta­ 76 Cut 110 Foot 76
tionary object
Beams, bars 67 Struck by, N 26 Contusion 21 Head 13
Struck by falling 16
object
Pipe 43 Struck by falling 10 Cut 19 Hand 9
object Sprains, strains 8 Back 8




Summary of Cross-Analysis Tabulation of SDS Accident/Injury Profile, 1976-1979,
for the Grain Elevator Industry (SIC 5153) (Continued)
Source of Injury Number Type of Accident Number Nature of Injury Number Body Part Injured Number
Boxes, Barrels, Containers, 
Packages





Sprains, strains 346 Ba ck 269
Boxes, crates, cartons 66 Overexertion in 
lifting objects








Barrels, kegs, drums 47 Overexertion in 
lifting objects
19 Sprains, strains 29 Back 24
Bundies, bales 47 Overexert ion in 
lifting objects









































Handtrucks 75 Struck by falling 
object














Forklift 72 Struck by, N 
Caught in, under, or 












Rail vehicles 59 Struck against sta­
tionary object 
Struck by, N 













Bodily Motion 460 Bodily reaction by 
involuntary motions 






















Summary of Cross-Analysis Tabulation of SDS Accident/Injury Profile, 1976-1979,
for the Grain Elevator Industry (SIC 5153) (Continued)
Source of Injury Number Type of Accident Number Nature of Injury Number Body Part Injured Number
Agricultural machines, N 89 Overexertion in 
lifting
Caught in, under, or 

























58 Struck against eta- 12
tionary object 
Rubbed by foreign 10
matter in eyes





























































Rubbed by foreign 
matter in eyes







88 Caught in, under, or 16
between, N














104 Burn (chemical) 90























Summary of Cross-Analysis Tabulation of SDS Accident/Injury Profile, 1976-1979,
for the Grain Elevator Industry (SIC 5153) (Continued)
Source of Injury Number Type of Accident Number Nature of Injury Number Body Part Injured Number
Conveyors 58 Caught in, under, or 12 Contusion 18 Finger(s) 14
between, N Cut 15 Back 8
Overexertion in 10 Sprains, strains 9
lifting objects
Flame, Fire, Smoke 105 Contact with hot 79 Burn (heat) 54 Multiple parts 64
objects or substances Multiple injuries 27
Buildings and Structures 99 Struck by, N 19 Contusion 29 Finger(s) 25
(doors, gates) Caught in, under, or 12
between, N
Grains and Grain Products 89 Contact by inhalation 31 Scratches 18 Respiratory system 32




Mechanical Power 45 Caught in, under, or 6 Fracture 8 Finger(s) 14
Transmission (chains, between, N Sprains, strains 8 Back 4
ropes, cables) Overexertion in 4
pulling
Compiled from Bureau of Labor Statistics' Supplementary Data System [17].
Note: N * Not Elsewhere Classified
1956 have occurred in industries handling grain, feed, and flour. Information 
presented by Chiotti and Verkade [6] for the 18-year period from 1958 through 
1975 includes records of dust explosions in 137 grain elevators and 50 feed 
and cereal mills in the United States, resulting in 336 injuries and 51 deaths.
A later listing of explosions was compiled and individually verified by the 
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) [1] from several sources, 
including Chiotti and Verkade [6]. This USDA compilation includes 250 explo­
sions in U.S. grain elevators and feed mills in the 21-year period from 1958 
through 1978 which resulted in 605 injuries and 164 deaths. A recently up­
dated USDA compilation includes 434 explosions in U.S. grain-handling facili­
ties in the 25-year period from 1958 through 1982 which resulted in 776 
injuries and 209 deaths [20]. Yearly explosions ranged from a high of 45 
incidents during 1980 to a low of 8 incidents during 1961 and 1965. The 
number of deaths per year ranged from 0 to 65, but normally was 8 or less. 
Chiotti and Verkade and the USDA both reported the lack of an accurate, 
comprehensive, and uniform reporting system, indicating that many additional 
incidents may not have been recorded.
The probable ignition sources in the 250 explosion incidents (1958 through 
1978) compiled by the USDA [1] are listed in Table 9. It is important to note 
that in 103 of the 250 incidents, the probable ignition source is unknown 
largely because of the lack of formal accident investigations. In other 
cases, the probable ignition source was reported on the basis of speculation 
by inexperienced investigators. Where the probable ignition source was 
reported, 43 incidents were attributed to welding or cutting. The next three 
most probable ignition sources are electrical failure, tramp metal, and fire 
other than welding or cutting. The probable locations of the primary explo­
sions in the cases compiled by the USDA are presented in Table 10. The proba­
ble location is unknown in 107 of the 250 incidents. Where the probable loca­
tion was reported, bucket elevators accounted for 58 of the 143 reported 
incidents (41%), followed by grinding equipment and storage bins in 17 (12%) 
and 13 (9%) incidents, respectively.
The USDA report [1] also estimated fire experience for the period from 1958 
through 1975 on the basis of data provided by the National Fire Protection 
Association. The number of fires in the grain-handling industry during this 
18-year period averaged about 2,700 incidents per year. On the basis of 
limited data, the USDA indicated that these numbers may have been understated 
by at least a factor of 2. Fires in grain elevators and feed mills result in 
the loss of millions of dollars in both direct expenses and lost time.
E. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The explosion hazard of grain dust has been known for many years. The U.S. 
Department of Agriculture has compiled a listing of 434 explosion incidents in 
grain elevators and feed mills in the United States over the 25-year period 
from 1958 through 1982. These incidents resulted in 776 injuries and 209 
deaths. Explosions in recent years, with the attendant loss of life and 
injuries to personnel, have focused attention on these spectacular disasters. 
In addition, available BLS statistics indicate that feed mills (2048) had an 









Welding or cutting 43 17.2
Electrical failure 10 4.0
Tramp metal 10 4.0
Fire other than welding or cutting 10 4.0
Unidentified foreign objects 9 3.6
Friction from choked leg 8 3.2
Overheated bearings 7 2.8
Unidentified spark 7 2.8
Friction sparks 7 2.8
Lightning 6 2.4
Extension cords caught in legs 4 1.6
Faulty motors 4 1.6
Static electricity 3 1.2
Fire from friction of slipping belt in leg 3 1.2
Leaking flammable vapor 3 1.2
Smoldering grain or meal handled 2 0.8
Smoking material 2 0.8
Lighted firecracker 1 0.4
Volatile chemical escaped from soybean processing 1 0.4
Fire from cob pile outside facility 1 0.4
Heating system 1 0.4
Pocket of gas in bin ignited 1 0.4
Extinguishing fire 1 0.4
Leak in gas pipe ignited 1 0.4
Electric control panel exploded 1 0.4
Slipping conveyor belt 1 0.4
Sample size 250 100.0
Reported by U.S. Department of Agriculture [1].
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Table 10






Bucket elevator 58 23.2
Hammermills, roller mills, or other grinding equipment 17 6.8
Storage bins or tanks 13 5.2
Headhouse 9 3.6
Adjacent or attached feed mill 8 3.2
Basement 4 1.6
Processing equipment 3 1.2
Dust collector 3 1.2
Tunnel 2 0.8
Distributor heads 2 0.8
Passenger elevator or manlift shaft 2 0.8
Grain drier 2 0.8
Outside and adjacent to facility 2 0.8
Pellet collector 2 0.8
Conveyor system 2 0.8
Receiving pit 2 0.8
Other handling equipment 2 0.8
Processing plant 1 0.4
Down spout 1 0.4
Corn tester 1 0.4
Feed room 1 0.4
Sampler 1 0.4
Storage room 1 0.4
Boiler or feed mill 1 0.4
Electrical switch 1 0.4
Auger conveyor 1 0.4
Electrical panel 1 0.4
Sample size 250 100.0
Reported by U.S. Department of Agriculture [1].
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From the statistics reported in this chapter, it appears that solutions for 
prevention of fire and explosion and reduction in work-related injuries are 
necessary.
Although solutions to the fire and explosion problem must be derived and 
implemented, overall safety cannot be achieved unless additional effort is 
made to reduce the number of other work-related injuries.
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III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE HAZARDS
A. INTRODUCTION
Workers in grain elevators and feed mills are exposed to a wide variety of 
conditions in the performance of their everyday tasks which could lead to 
accidents and injuries. This section addresses in detail hazards associated 
with fires and explosions as well as other applicable industrial hazards. 
Health hazards are included primarily to acknowledge their existence and the 
need for their control. Also included are case histories of accidents/ 
incidents that might have been prevented if safe work practices had been 
observed or if engineering or management controls had been instituted.
B. FIRES AND EXPLOSIONS
1. Components of a Grain Dust Explosion
For a grain dust explosion to occur, the following conditions must be met: 
o Grain dust must be present,
o An ignition source must be present.
o Oxygen must be present in a concentration to sustain rapid 
combustion.
o The grain dust must be well mixed with the oxygen at a concentration 
above the lower explosive limit.
o Ignition must occur in an enclosed space.
The above five conditions are also referred to as the "explosion pentagon" [2, 
21].
Kauffman [21] states that for an explosion to occur, dust must be well mixed 
with air from both the chemical and physical points of view. For heterogene­
ous combustion, the rate of reaction is dependent upon the surface area of the 
dust particles. Small particles may be easily dispersed ensuring that the 
maximum available surface area is in contact with the surrounding air. If 
combustion initiates in this mixture, confinement causes an increase in pres­
sure. The high pressure gases resulting from the combustion process will try 
to flow toward a low pressure area, thereby creating a flow velocity which 
ensures the mixing of more dust with the air. The rate of combustion in­
creases with increasing pressure, thereby creating even more high pressure 
gases, thus resulting in an explosion. If the requirements for mixing or con­
finement are not met, a fire rather than an explosion may result.
It is possible to prevent an explosion by deleting any one of the five condi­
tions. In any fire and explosion protection program, these conditions must be 
eliminated or controlled so that a fire and/or explosion will not occur [21].
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2. Dust Concentration
Grain breakage occurs initially at harvest and continues through each subse­
quent handling. Particles range in size from respirable particles of about 17 
microns or less to particles of 120 microns or more [2]. The dust may be 
suspended in the air, settled out onto horizontal surfaces, or adhered to 
vertical surfaces.
In contrast to gaseous mixtures, the lower explosive limit for grain dust is 
not well defined, and different values can be found for the same kind of dust 
[22, 23]. Differences can be attributed mainly to test variables such as
turbulence, uniformity of the dispersion, and duration of the ignition
source. A number of sources [1, 2, 19, 23] report lower explosive limits
ranging from 20 to 55 grams per cubic meterCg/m^) for grain dust clouds.
Even for a lower explosive limit as low as 20g/m-^ (the lowest required for 
an explosion), a grain dust cloud with this concentration resembles a very 
dense fog [19, 23]. Although it is improbable that this concentration would
exist in the work areas, it is very likely that it does exist within
enclosures such as bucket elevators, conveyor housings, bins, and connecting 
spouts [2, 23]. For the upper explosive limit, also not well defined,
estimates vary from 2,000 to 3,000g/m3. Peak explosive pressures generally
occur near concentrations of 1,000 g/m^ [24]. The explosive properties of 
some common grain dusts are given in Table 11.
The explosibility of a particular dust is determined by its concentration in 
air and influenced by factors such as chemical composition and particle size. 
The presence of noncombustibles, such as mineral matter or moisture, decreases 
the explosibility. Increases in particle size also decrease explosibility 
[25]. To facilitate evaluation of the explosibility of dusts and to give a 
numerical rating for the relative hazard, an empirical index of explosibility 
was developed by the U.S. Bureau of Mines [26]. The index provides a relative 
rating of explosibility as a function of ignition temperature, ignition 
energy, explosion concentration, explosion pressure, and rate of pressure rise 
as compared to a standard Pittsburgh coal dust (index equal to 1.0). For a 
weak explosion the index of explosibility would be less than 0.1; moderate,
0.1 to 1.0; strong, 1.0 to 10; and severe, greater than 10.. The indices of 
explosibility of corn and wheat dusts within this system are 8.4 and 2.5, 
respectively.
The synergistic effect between grain dust and fumigants has also been sug­
gested as a factor contributing to explosions in grain elevators and feed 
mills. Surveys sponsored by the National Grain and Feed Association indicate 
that gases and vapors emanating from decomposing or fumigated grain do not 
present an explosion hazard in grain elevators [27, 28]. Laboratory testing, 
however, has indicated that the presence of the fumigants did lower the 
minimum ignition energy from 0.180 joules to 0.125 joules [29].
The presence of layered dust is a significant problem. Dust settles not only
on floors, ledges, and other horizontal surfaces, but also to some extent on 
vertical surfaces and ceilings. If agitated, layered dust may lead to explo­
sive airborne concentrations. Burning or smoldering dust which is settled may 
also ignite airborne dust concentrations or become airborne itself. Dust on 
warm surfaces such as machinery, motors, bearings, or lighting fixtures tends
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Table 11






















Alfalfa meal 455 7.6 460 200 0.32 100
Cereal grass 360 3.5 550 220 0.80 200
Corn 655 41 400 250 0.04 55
Corncob grit 760 21 450 240 0.045 45
Corn dextrin pure 725 48 400 370 0.04 40
Cornstarch commercial 
product
745 48 380 330 0.04 45
Cornstarch through 
325 mesh
790 62 390 350 0.03 40
Flax shive 560 5.5 430 230 0.08 80
Grain dust, winter 
wheat, corn, oats
790 38 430 230 0.03 55
Grass seed, blue 165 1.4 490 180 0.26 290
Rice 640 18 440 220 0.05 50
Rice bran 420 9 490 --- 0.08 45
Safflower meal 580 20 460 210 0.025 55
Soy flour 540 5.5 540 190 0.10 60
Soy protein 660 65 520 260 0.05 35
Wheat, untreated 710 25 500 220 0.06 65
Wheat flour 655 26 380 360 0.05 50
Wheat starch, edible 690 45 420 --- 0.025 45
Wheat straw 680 41 470 220 0.050 55
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to dry out and becomes susceptible to ignition at temperatures as low as 200°C 
(392°F) [19]. The layered dust is acknowledged to be the source of immensely 
damaging secondary explosions [25]. The primary explosion resulting from 
ignition of airborne dust may be relatively small; however, pressure waves and 
structural vibrations dislodge layered dust which, in turn, explodes and 
dislodges more dust, propagating the explosion through the entire facility.
3. Ignition Source
The minimum amount of energy required to ignite common grain dusts, such as 
corn and wheat, is in the range of 30 to 60 millijoules [26]. Ignition may 
occur as the result of releasing thermal, mechanical, or electrical energy. 
The primary cause of ignition in the thermal category is hot work. Extremely 
high temperatures and sparks generated during welding and cutting operations 
have resulted in more fires and explosions than any other identified source. 
Fires and explosions caused by hot work generally occur because inadequate 
precautions have been taken to remove or protect combustibles, or because 
dust-producing operations are performed concurrently with, or immediately 
after, the hot work is performed.
Explosions in a pet food mill in December 1977, resulted in 4 people killed 
and 15 injured [30]. Two explosions, which occurred almost simultaneously, 
blew out the walls of the mill building and resulted in extensive damage to 
equipment. The cause of the explosion has not been conclusively determined; 
however, OSHA investigators believe that a hot weld was the most likely source 
of ignition. Based on eyewitness accounts and an examination of the damages, 
OSHA investigators concluded that immediately after a weld was completed on a 
wheat bin, the grinder feeding the bin was started. The wheat grain dust 
blown into the bin exploded.
Other thermally-related ignition sources include open flames such as matches, 
lighters, cigarettes, and space heaters.
Internal combustion engines used in front-end loaders and other industrial 
trucks may also generate sufficient surface temperatures to cause ignition of 
grain dust; however, no instances of explosions being caused by these vehicles 
have been reported.
Mechanical ignition sources generate sparks or heat as the result of friction
or impact. Sparks cau occur from the introduction of foreign materials such
as metal or stones into fast-moving handling and processing equipment. Entry 
of foreign material into high speed grinding equipment is the acknowledged 
cause of several explosions [6, 31]. Following bucket elevators, explosions 
are most likely to initiate in hammer mills, roller mills, and other grinding 
equipment [1]. An explosion may occur in the grinder, or burning materials 
may initiate an explosion in downstream storage areas or conveying equipment 
such as bucket elevators.
Foreign materials in a grinder are thought to have caused a series of explo­
sions in a feed mill in Victoria, Australia in January 1980, which resulted in
one injury and extensive damage to the facility [31]. Evidence suggests that 
a particle of stone or metal passed through a hammer mill into a nearly empty 
bin where the air/dust ratio was conducive to ignition. Following the initial 
explosion, a continuous series of explosions propagated through inter­
connecting spouts, turnheads, and internal portholes.
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Entry of foreign material into other handling equipment, such as bucket eleva­
tors, is also a potential problem, although there is some question as to 
whether sparks which are generated when foreign materials strike metal casings 
or moving parts contain sufficient energy to ignite a dust cloud 123]. Me­
chanical sparks or heating can also occur as the result of equipment malfunc­
tion or during routine use of equipment such as power tools and shovels. In 
addition, foreign materials can jam operating equipment leading to friction 
fires.
Bucket elevators are the most frequent location of primary explosions 12]. 
Potential ignition sources in bucket elevators include sparks or friction from 
tramp metal, misaligned belts or pulleys, and metallic buckets striking the 
leg casings. However, friction resulting from belt slippage under choked con­
ditions is more likely to generate the amount of energy required for igni­
tion. If slippage continues, dust deposits may ignite or belt burn-through 
may occur, resulting in the belt dropping down the elevator leg.
A jammed elevator leg was reported to be the probable cause of an explosion in 
a feed mill in April 1978 [32], where two people were killed and 39 were in­
jured. The explosion destroyed two headhouses and damaged several silos. The 
facility was supposed to have been turned off at the end of a shift; however, 
officials believed that at least one elevator leg was still operating and had 
jammed. The problem was not detected and, as the drive motor continued to
operate, the belt burned through allowing the buckets to fall into the leg.
Kauffman [33] reported an explosion in a medium-sized elevator in 1979 that 
was caused by a choked bucket elevator. One fatality and three injuries
occurred along with severe damage to the facility. The shipping elevator leg 
had choked and bad been jogged, resulting in a fire at the head pulley. The 
access panel to the boot was removed in an attempt to clear the choke by
hand. The belt subsequently burned through and dropped creating a dust cloud 
in the boot area and splitting the metal leg casing. The burning belt ignited 
the dust cloud and the explosion resulted.
Electrical ignition sources may be associated with the use of electrical power 
or the buildup of electrostatic charges. Sparks generated by normal operation 
of electrical components such as switches, contacts, motors, and fuses can 
generate sufficient energy to ignite dust clouds. Arcing from equipment 
malfunctions, damaged wiring, or broken light bulbs may also ignite dust. 
Chiotti and Verkade [6] list several cases in which electrical equipment was 
reported as the cause. In one incident, a light bulb with a faulty extension 
cord was being used to illuminate a bucket elevator boot pit. Although the 
head guard and grip of the light were approved as being dust-tight, the 
extension cord shorted, causing a dust explosion which resulted in one injury 
and moderate damage to the facility.
Surface temperatures of electrical equipment such as heaters, motors, and 
exposed light bulbs can exceed the ignition temperature of layered dust. 
Kauffman [33] reported an explosion at a medium-sized grain elevator which 
resulted in two injuries and substantial damage to the facility. A fire 
resulted from a permanent light fixture being buried in accumulated dust in 
the boot well of a bucket elevator. The water stream applied to the fire by 
the fire department dispersed grain dust into the air which was then ignited 
by the existing fire. A series of explosions propagated throughout the 
facility; however, bin damage was minimized by effective venting.
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Electrostatic charges are generated in the normal handling of grain on equip­
ment such as conveyors and spouts. Electrostatic discharge is generally con­
sidered a potential ignition source; however, the degree of risk is not well 
understood. Buildup of static electricity on belt conveyors is common and 
discharges have been observed; however, no instances of fires or explosions 
direcjtly attributable to static discharges on belt conveyors have been conclu­
sively reported.
Lightning strikes are also reported to have been probable ignition sources for 
dust explosions in grain elevators and feed mills [1, 34].
A number of potential ignition sources for grain dust have been known for many 
years. However, lack of data on the specific circumstances of most explosions 
makes it difficult to ludge what actions would be most effective for the con­
trol of ignition sources. It is generally agreed that hot work, open flames, 
and smoking should be prohibited or conducted under tightly controlled condi­
tions. Other ignition sources, such as static electricity and sparks from 
foreign material striking metal bucket elevator cups, are widely debated. 
There are various opinions on the extent and degree of the hazard [23].
4. Oxygen Concentration
The amount of oxygen in ambient air is more than adequate to support grain 
dust explosions. Oxygen concentrations above 12% are sufficient to sustain 
combustion. The lower explosive limit in the presence of 13% oxygen is 
approximately 40 times greater than that in 20% oxygen. The minimum ignition 
energy is increased by a similar amount [35]. The use of inert gases such as 
nitrogen or carbon dioxide to replace oxygen may be advantageous in some 
cases; however, inert gas atmospheres are not considered to be practical for 
use on a large scale.
5. Mixing of Dust
The mixing of dust with oxygen occurs mainly at transfer points, where grain 
is falling, and within enclosures. It is desirable to keep the grain stream 
from entraining large quantities of air. If this is not possible, the dust 
mixture should be collected through the use of a dust collection system [21].
6. Confinement
Dust explosions occur only in relatively enclosed spaces. Confinement may 
occur in elevator legs, bins, grinders, dust-collection equipment, and in many 
cases, the basic facility structure. Pressure buildup resulting from explo­
sions may be well above the rupture strength of common construction materials, 
and extensive damage can occur unless adequate pressure relief vent areas 
exist. In addition, this pressure buildup creates the air flow velocity 
necessary to suspend layered dust, which provides fuel for devastating 
secondary explosions. For most grain elevators and feed mills, vent areas do 
not provide sufficient pressure relief to prevent destructive pressure levels 
[24].
C. GENERAL INDUSTRIAL HAZARDS
Employees in grain elevators and feed mills may be exposed to a wide variety 
of hazardous conditions during the performance of their jobs. The majority of
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these hazards exist, to some extent, throughout industry, although certain
characteristics of grain elevators and feed mills may magnify the degree of
risk. Specific hazardous conditions which could result in accidents are 
discussed below.
1. Facility Interfaces
Accidents may occur as a direct result of the interface with facility walking 
surfaces, stairs, ladders, and manlifts. Overhead obstructions, narrow aisle- 
ways, or elevated work stations may also contribute to accidents.
Hazards associated with walking surfaces vary considerably. Floors may be 
slippery because of loose grain, grain dust, dampness, oil, or grease. Loose 
dust gives little traction, causing many slips and falls. It is especially 
difficult to walk on round commodities such as soybeans. Inadequate storage 
and poor work practices may result in various materials being placed in 
walkways. Trash and debris may block escape routes or contain exposed nails 
or other sharp objects. Accidents may also be caused by uneven walking sur­
faces or loose or defective gratings. Bin and floor openings can account for 
serious injuries as the result of trips or falls [36]. Bin openings usually
have covers, but they are not always replaced after use.
Fixed and portable ladders are frequently used in the grain industry for
access to different work levels and equipment, emergency egress, or as means
of escape from a stalled manlift or personnel elevator. Slippery rungs and 
the improper use of the ladders are causes of accidents that need to be 
addressed [37]. Various types of safety devices are available to minimize the 
chance of falls from ladders, but these are not always provided or used.
Belt manlifts are commonly used to transport employees from one work level to 
another. A belt manlift consists of a vertical, continuous belt with plat­
forms and handles attached. The frame and drive system of a manlift are simi­
lar to those used on a bucket elevator, although the manlift is operated at a 
slower speed. The manlift connects the various work levels through openings
in the floors. The belt may run the entire height of the facility. Accidents
may result from loose or broken platforms and handholds; or, employees may be 
injured by contacting the structure when moving through the floor openings 
[A]. Falls may also occur as a result of lack of attention or carelessness. 
Another danger is the lack of a guard rail to prevent employees from falling 
into the floor openings. Although intended for personnel only, manlifts are 
sometimes used to transport equipment between floors, increasing the chance of 
a fall or of material being dropped on someone below. Employees may also use 
manlifts without being properly instructed in safe operating procedures.
Overhead obstructions and narrow aisleways are common in many grain elevators 
and feed mills. Obstructions include ducts, pipes, spouts, machinery, cat­
walks, conveyors, and physical parts of the facility. Injuries can occur if 
proper bead protection is not worn. Narrow aisleways may result in personnel 
injury from contact with moving equipment or machinery.
The multilevel construction of many facilities frequently requires that work 
be performed at elevated levels. Maintenance and repair on freestanding 
equipment or equipment on platforms, such as marine towers, are common. 
Working at heights or at any work station with one or more sides open exposes 
workers to the chance of a serious injury. Additionally, workers at elevated
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levels could possibly drop equipment or tools, causing injury to someone 
below. Access to areas below workers should be restricted where the
possibility of falling items exists.
2. Equipment Interfaces
Employees of grain elevators and feed mills frequently interface with moving 
machinery such as conveyors, drive motors, drive belts, gears, and pulleys.
Hazards associated with moving machinery include pinch points and nip points 
where two moving pieces of machinery come together or where a moving piece of 
machinery travels close to a stationary object. These points can catch a 
person's clothing, hair, - or other parts of the body and draw them into the 
dangerous area, causing a crushing type of injury. Injury may also occur as 
the result of contact with unguarded rotating or translating equipment.
Unguarded augers can be especially dangerous. Although guards are required by 
OSHA regulations, adequate devices are not always provided [4]. In one 
reported incident, a man was crushed and killed when trapped between a con­
veyor and a tension roller. Fencing was provided by the manufacturer on the
basic installation; however, the tension roller had been added later. The
fixed fencing provided for the other rollers was not extended to cover the nip 
point of the tension roller into which the worker was pulled and trapped [38].
Belt conveyors frequently run for long distances. Unless adequate crossovers 
are provided, employees may attempt to step on or over the belt. Conveyors 
could be started remotely, or the employee could lose his balance over a run­
ning conveyor. Either case could result in a serious injury.
Compressed air equipment is a common source of injury. Improper use may 
result in direct eye injury, or dislodged materials may enter the eye or be 
ingested. Direction of the air stream toward the body can also drive foreign 
materials under the skin. Pressure regulation devices are often unused or 
bypassed and protective equipment may not be used [39].
Maintenance and repair are ongoing processes in any industry. Operations may 
be performed by employees or outside contractors. Many serious accidents 
occur when employees activate equipment unaware that work is being done on the 
equipment by other employees. The chance of equipment being inadvertently 
started during maintenance is a problem that usually can be attributed to the 
lack of a lockout or tagout system, or failure to implement the system [40, 
41]. Present industry practices vary from non-organized systems to fully 
documented techniques rigidly enforced by management. One worker was killed 
as he leaned into the machine to clean the ribbon blades while performing a 
routine cleanup of a batch mixer. The main switch for the mixer was on a 
separate floor and was located adjacent to another switch box. Another 
employee operated the switch and inadvertently turned on the machine. He knew 
the mixer was being cleaned, although he thought the job had been completed 
earlier. Company policy dictated the use of lockout procedures for all 
maintenance and cleaning operations; however, the procedures were not followed 
[42]. In another case, two workmen were standing on a stationary belt 
conveyor preparing to remove a chute above it. As they were standing there, 
the conveyor started. One man was thrown against the side of the chute and was 
killed. It was later determined that the conveyor had not been isolated,
although there was an established procedure to do so [38].
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Other general maintenance problems may occur from improper use of hand or 
power tools or while using grinding, cutting, or welding equipment. Except 
for those flammability considerations addressed previously, the associated 
hazards are not unique to grain elevators and feed mills.
3. Vehicles and Lifting Equipment
Various types of vehicles and lifting equipment are used for material and 
equipment handling in and around grain elevators and feed mills. In addition 
to the vehicles used for shipping and receiving, small industrial trucks are 
common. Lifting devices, such as hoists, are also used in most facilities.
The receiving and shipping areas of grain elevators are generally the areas of 
highest activity. Rail receiving areas are probably the most dangerous as the 
result of moving rail cars and engines. Injuries may also occur from use of 
heavy equipment, car pullers, or the use of large pry bars for opening boxcar 
doors or hopper car dump valves. Employees may be required to climb rail cars 
for sampling or other activities, and falls may occur. In addition, contact 
with overhead electric wires can cause electrocution. Use of restraints when 
working on rail cars is not always feasible. Barge receiving and shipping 
areas introduce hazards associated with water and with movement of the barges 
during loading and unloading. Footing is frequently poor in dock areas. 
Truck receiving hazards include the possibility of being struck by a moving 
vehicle or falling into an open dump platform pit. In some cases, trucks can 
fall from an elevated platform if not properly secured or if the load shifts 
rapidly due to the collapse of a trailer which is in poor mechanical condi­
tion. Also, personnel may be required to crawl under hopper-type trucks to 
open and close dump valves.
Industrial trucks include forklifts and front-end loaders. Associated hazards 
are usually related to lack of adequate training, operating outside of design 
limits, or lack of employee attention.
Hoists are also used extensively for lifting large components and equipment. 
Smaller units are used for lowering personnel into bins. Accidents may result 
from defective or inadequately secured equipment or from working on unpro­
tected, elevated platforms. Ropes, cables, boatswain's chairs, slings, hooks, 
winches, braces, and their interconnections should be properly maintained and 
inspected periodically.
4. Manual Handling
Many handling operations are performed manually. These operations result in 
numerous back injuries and sprains from improper handling techniques or 
handling oversize or overweight material. Employees should be instructed in 
proper handling techniques [43].
5. Confined Spaces
Entering and working in confined spaces such as bins, tunnels, tanks, and pits 
are common. Accessibility and maneuverability are frequently difficult, and 
there may be a lack of direct communication to standby personnel. Dust in
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suspension may limit visibility and necessitate the use of dust masks or 
respirators. These conditions tend to magnify an occurrence which normally 
might be a minor incident [44].
Lack of a suitable atmosphere as the result of poor ventilation or possibly 
the use of fumigants can be a problem when entering confined spaces. Oxygen 
may be consumed as the result of chemical reactions such as the fermentation 
of grain. In a case reported by the National Safety Council [45], a man evi­
dently was overcome by a lack of oxygen at the bottom of a flat-bottomed bin. 
Since he was out of his boatswain's chair, fellow workers were not able to 
rescue him. In another case, a worker suffocated when lowered by hoist into a 
grain storage bin to clear a blockage of grain. The worker was employed by an 
outside firm, hired by the grain company. Tests by safety inspectors later 
showed that the oxygen level in the bin was as low as 3 percent. Officials 
said the grain blocking the bottom of the bin had fermented, using up most of 
the oxygen. The atmosphere in the bin was not tested for oxygen deficiency 
before sending the worker inside.
Entrapment and suffocation are special hazards in grain bins. Suspended grain 
or crusted surfaces may suddenly break loose and bury workers. Entrapment and 
burial can occur within a matter of seconds [4, 46]. In one incident, a man 
was swinging in a boatswain's chair suspended on a 3/8-inch steel rope in a 
bin containing soybean meal. While poking down some of the meal, he allowed
the chair to swing below the level of the material. The meal released sudden­
ly and fell on him, breaking the steel rope and carrying him to the bottom 
[45].
In another case, two men were working outside a bin which was being emptied of 
grain. They thought the bin was clear enough to be entered through the bottom 
access door. One of the men entered and was buried by material which was 
adhering to the sides of the bin. He was unable to find the access door, and 
the other man failed to locate him in time to save him [45].
Some grains act like quicksand, and the hazard is intensified if material is 
being drawn from the bottom of the bin. A fatality occurred as the direct 
result of running an auger to remove grain while workers were cleaning a bin. 
One worker was trapped by the suction created by the auger and was not able to 
free himself, even with the assistance of another employee in the bin. The 
other employee was not able to communicate with other employees or egress the
bin in time to save the worker [47].
6. Health Hazards
The primary health hazards in grain elevators and feed mills are: (1) Exposure 
to toxic fumigants and pesticides and (2) exposure to grain dust. In addition 
to being a "nuisance dust," grain dust can contain insects, fungi, and molds. 
It was concluded in a recent study that grain handlers had a higher prevalence 
of respiratory symptoms than comparable nongrain-handling workers. On certain 
occasions, the symptoms of exposure to time-weighted average (TWA) total dust 
levels below accepted TWA nuisance dust recommendations (15mg/m3) (29 CFR
1910.1000(c)) appeared to affect workers' performance and sense of well being 
[48, 49]. All workers are exposed to dust to some degree; however, dust
levels vary widely between facilities and specific locations within 
facilities. Various tasks, such as cleaning and sweeping, usually result in
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high airborne dust levels. Dust masks are used in nearly all facilities; 
however, types of masks and degree of their usage are inconsistent.
Applying fumigants and pesticides, without taking proper precautions or using 
adequate protective equipment, can be harmful. Hazards are usually correlated 
with the individuals applying the chemicals; however, other personnel may be 
exposed. Fumigants applied at the bin top may leak into basements where per­
sonnel are working, or employees may enter a tank which still contains 
vapors. Grain may also be fumigated in one facility and shipped without the 
receiving facility being informed. Although not specifically addressed in 
this document, exposure to dust, fumigants, and pesticides needs to be 
considered as one of the overall health problems.
Other health problems in grain-handling and grain-processing facilities may 
include exposure to noise and vibration. High noise levels can occur as a 
result of machinery operation as well as grain being thrown against casings or 
spouts. Vibration results from the operation of various machinery and 
associated drive motors and gears.
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IV. SAFE WORK PRACTICES, ENGINEERING CONTROLS, AND TRAINING NEEDS
A. INTRODUCTION
This section contains the practices recommended as a means of reducing acci­
dents and injuries in grain elevators and feed mills. The recommendations are 
designed to make the workplace safer and to make workers and management aware 
of the hazards normally associated with these facilities. The recommendations 
are performance oriented where possible, stating the goal to be achieved. 
Successful methods of achieving the goal, and the criteria upon which the 
recommendations are based, are addressed where applicable.
B. DEFINITION OF TERMS
The following definitions are used for purposes of this document:
Bucket Elevator. A continuous conveyor belt with equally spaced buckets 
attached, which elevates and discharges material into a spout or other 
receiver. Elevation is usually vertical, although some bucket elevators 
are sloping. The main sections of a bucket elevator are usually referred 
to as the head, boot, and leg. The head is the top section of a bucket 
elevator where the drive is located and the material is discharged. The 
boot is the bottom section where material enters the bucket elevator and 
is picked up by tbe buckets. The leg is the section between the head and 
boot.
Choke Feeding. A condition of material buildup in a spout or hopper with­
out stoppage of discharge flow. Choke feeding may be used to provide an 
even feeding rate or reduce grain breakage and dust generation.
Choked Condition. A condition of material buildup in spouts, hoppers, or 
equipment that results in stoppage of material flow in a conveying system.
Class II Locations. Locations that are hazardous because of the presence 
of combustible dust. Class II locations include the following [49, 50]:
o Class II, Division 1— A Class II, Division 1 location is a loca­
tion: (1) In which combustible dust is or may be in suspension in
the air, under normal operating conditions, in quantities suffici­
ent to produce explosive or ignitable mixtures; or (2) where
mechanical failure or abnormal operation of machinery or equipment
might cause such explosive or ignitable mixtures to be produced,
and might also provide a source of ignition through simultaneous 
failure of electrical equipment, operation of protective devices, 
or from other causes; or (3) in which combustible dusts of an
electrically conductive nature may be present.
o Class II, Division 2— A Class II, Division 2 location is a loca­
tion: (1) in which combustible dust will not normally be in
suspension in the air in quantities sufficient to produce explo­
sive or ignitable mixtures, and dust accumulations are normally
insufficient to interfere with the normal operation of electrical 
equipment or other apparatuses; or (2) in which dust may be in 
suspension in the air as a result of infrequent malfunctioning
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of handling or processing equipment, and dust accumulations
resulting therefrom may be ignitable by abnormal operation or
failure of electrical equipment or other apparatuses.
Combustible Dust. A dust which may explode or burn when subjected to a
source of ignition in the presence of atmospheric oxygen.
Confined Space. A space which by design has limited openings for entry 
and exit, unfavorable natural ventilation which could contain or produce 
dangerous air contaminants, and which is not intended for continuous 
employee occupancy. Confined spaces include but are not limited to 
storage tanks, compartments of ships, process vessels, pits, silos, vats, 
degreasers, reaction vessels, boilers, ventilation and exhaust ducts, 
sewers, tunnels, underground utility vaults, and pipelines.
Dust. Any finely divided solid material formed by disintegration proces­
ses whether product or waste.
Explosion. Combustion of a dust, vapor, or gas which results in the rapid 
development of heat and pressure beyond the confinement capability of an 
enclosed space.
Feed Mill. An establishment primarily engaged in manufacturing feed for 
animals.
Foreign Material. Any unwanted objects or materials inadvertently mixed 
with the grain or feed. Foreign materials may include nails, bolts, 
sticks, stones, dirt, and other similar items.
Grain Elevator. An establishment primarily engaged in the receipt, hand­
ling, storage, and shipment of grain (such as corn, wheat, oats, barley, 
and unpolished rice) and beans. Facilities may be classified as country 
elevators, inland terminals, or port terminals, or may be operated in
support of grain-processing facilities.
Group G Atmospheres. Atmospheres containing flour, starch, or grain dust.
Headhouse. A portion of a grain elevator used to house grain-handling
equipment. The headhouse may include equipment to elevate, weigh, sample,
and clean grain; to direct grain to bins or conveyors, or to perform other 
operations. The terms "headhouse" and "workhouse" are usually inter­
changeable, although sometimes the section of the workhouse that extends
above the bins is referred to as the headhouse because the head pulleys of
the bucket elevators are located there.
Hot Work. Work involving electric or gas welding, cutting, brazing, or
similar heat-producing operations, as well as work such as grinding, which 
produces a potential source of ignition.
Jogging. Repeated starting of drive motors in an attempt to clear choked
equipment.
Lagging. A covering on drive pulleys used to increase the coefficient of 
friction between the pulley and the belt. Lagging may have a smooth or 
grooved surface and is usually installed on belt conveyor and bucket
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elevator bead pulleys as well as flat belt power transmission pulleys.
Lower Explosive Limit (LEL). The minimum concentration of a flammable or 
combustible gas, vapor, or dust in air which will allow flame propagation.
Permissible Exposure Limit (PEL). The maximum amount of any airborne 
contaminant to which an employee may be exposed as listed in 29 CFR 1910 
Subpart Z [49].
Permit. An authorization and approval in writing that specifies the loca­
tion and the work to be performed, and certifies that all hazards have 
been evaluated by a qualified person and necessary protective measures
have been taken to ensure the safety of each worker.
Qualified Person. A person, designated by the employer, capable (by 
reason of training and/or experience) of recognizing and evaluating expo­
sure to unsafe conditions and specifying necessary controls and/or actions 
to ensure worker safety.
Scalper. Screening machinery used to remove foreign material larger than 
the grain or feed itself.
Tramp Metal. Any metallic objects or materials that are inadvertently 
mixed with the grain or feed. Tramp metal may include nails, bolts, 
wires, tools, or any other metallic items.
Tripper. A device used to divert grain or material from a conveyor belt 
into a bin opening, hopper spout, or machine.
Turnhead. A device that distributes or routes grain or material from one
spout, bin hopper, or machine to two or more bins, spouts, or machines.
C. TRAINING
Occupational hazards are caused by the interaction between workplace, ma­
chines, and humans.
The value of employee training is recognized throughout industry. A safe 
operation largely depends upon employees who are properly informed and aware 
of the potential hazards. To be effective, training must be done by a knowl­
edgeable person and must address safe performance of the assigned tasks as 
well as other relevant aspects of hazard recognition and control within the 
workplace [51-57]. The employer is responsible for establishing a training 
program commensurate with the tasks to be performed and safe work practices to 
be followed.
Personnel need to be made aware of the hazards of dust explosions, general 
hazards which may be encountered in grain elevators and feed mills, the 
specific hazards which may be encountered in the performance of their assigned 
tasks, and the necessary actions or precautions to be taken to prevent 
accidents. In addition to training for the equipment, machinery, and vehicles 
which the employee will operate or use to accomplish the assigned tasks, 
training should cover the use of personal protective equipment, emergency 
procedures, and other applicable work practices recommended in this report.
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Training programs should include both general orientation sessions and on-the- 
job training. Safety orientation should include classroom sessions addressing 
safety rules and policies and a walk-through of the facility. After the
employee has received a basic understanding of the operation and the hazards
involved, on-tbe-job instruction including demonstrations and supervised 
participation in actual work practices should be provided. Training should
not be considered complete until it has been demonstrated to the satisfaction 
of the employer, or the person designated by the employer to conduct the
training, that the employee is able to perform the assigned tasks safely and
is familiar with the precautions that must be taken in the workplace to pre­
vent injuries. Retraining should be conducted as needed to ensure that
workers are able to perform their duties in a safe manner.
Safety orientation programs should also be developed for contractor person­
nel. The program should address safety rules and policies, hazards associated 
with combustible dust, and other specific hazards that may be encountered in 
grain elevators and feed mills with which the contractor personnel may not be 
familiar.
D. SAFETY PROGRAM AND ENGINEERING CONTROLS
The first step in an effective safety program is management commitment. To
reduce accidents, it is essential that management be fully committed to work
safety and insist that all employees be involved. Employers are required by
law to provide a place of employment free from recognized hazards. To achieve 
this end, management must ensure that hazards are identified and effective
hazard controls are developed, implemented, and remain in continuous use [58,
59]. Persons responsible for safety in the facility should be clearly
identified.
Identification of hazards and associated safe work practices can best be
accomplished by conducting a system safety analysis of the facility and opera­
tions. Various techniques such as a "job safety analysis," which breaks jobs
into a sequence of steps that can be more easily addressed, can be applied. 
Safety analyses can be performed informally; however, a formal approach which 
results in detailed operational procedures is usually most effective. Analy­
sis should initially be accomplished on operations where experience indicates 
accidents and injuries are most likely to occur.
As a part of an effective safety program, management should:
o Ensure compliance with safety and health regulations
o Establish an effective training program
o Establish emergency preparedness plans
o Establish necessary controls for visitors and outside contractors
o Ensure that a comprehensive dust control program is developed and
implemented
o Ensure that the safe work practices contained in the report are
evaluated and applied where applicable
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o Ensure that all equipment and machinery are in a safe operating condi­
tion, are capable of safely performing the job for which they are 
used, and are regularly maintained and inspected
o Ensure that adequate procedural controls are developed and implemented 
for hot work, confined space entry, and other potentially hazardous 
operations.
o Establish and enforce general safety rules. Rules should address use 
of smoking materials, alcohol, drugs, and weapons as well as policies 
covering use of protective equipment and accident reporting systems. 
Compliance with safety policies should be stipulated as a condition of 
employment.
Employee safety committees can be key elements of industrial safety programs. 
Committees typically meet periodically with management representatives to 
examine potential safety issues and recommend abatement procedures. Committee 
members may also perform safety inspections, review accident reports, and per­
form other safety-related functions.
E. EMERGENCY PLANNING
The value of emergency planning as a means of conserving life and property is 
generally recognized throughout industry [36, 60-62]. Timely and efficient
action can mean the difference between a minor incident and a major 
catastrophe. Coordination with local emergency organizations is strongly 
recommended. Fire departments and rescue organizations in particular should 
be requested to tour facilities to become familiar with the particular prob­
lems that may be encountered and should also have an awareness of bow to deal
with a fire in a grain-handling facility.
Preplanning is needed to determine specific duties, responsibilities, and 
actions that should be taken to enhance worker safety during emergencies. 
Written procedures should be developed in accordance with 29 CFR 1910.38 [49] 
for fires, explosions, medical emergencies, and other emergencies or natural 
disasters that could reasonably occur. Other areas to be addressed and the 
specific content of the procedures should be determined by a qualified person 
on the basis of the facility size, conditions at the facility, and geographic 
location. Procedures may include provisions for limiting facility damage if 
this can be accomplished without additional risk; however, safety of personnel 
must take precedence. The procedures should include, but not be limited to, 
the following:
o Methods and responsibilities for reporting emergency conditions. Pro­
visions for prompt reporting of emergencies should always be a primary
consideration. Protective signaling systems can be provided or emer­
gencies can be reported over intercoms or public address systems.
Telephones or radios may also be used to report emergencies to a 
central, continuously manned location.
o Methods and responsibilities for contacting emergency agencies. Emer­
gency phone numbers should be posted in suitable locations.
o Location of firefighting, medical, and other emergency equipment
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o Evacuation procedures and location of evacuation routes. Routes
should be posted in conspicuous and convenient locations.
o Methods and responsibilities for firefighting, rescue, providing medi­
cal aid, and other special assignments. Fire brigades, when estab­
lished by an employer, must comply with the requirements contained in 
29 CFR 1910.156 [49]. Specific training in fighting grain fires
should be included.
o Methods and responsibilities for accounting for workers, visitors, or
contractor personnel who may be in or immediately around the facility
A means of informing workers of an emergency should be an integral part of the 
emergency plan [36, 61, 63]. An employee alarm system must be provided, main­
tained, and tested in accordance with 29 CFR 1910.165 [49].
For the emergency plan to be effective it must be thoroughly understood by all 
affected personnel [36, 61, 63]. Training and instruction should be accom­
plished when a worker is initially hired and subsequently whenever the 
worker's actions or responsibilities change or procedures are modified. 
Retraining and/or drills should be conducted periodically to ensure that 
workers remain familiar with the procedures. Additional training is needed at 
least annually where personnel are assigned special duties such as firefight­
ing and rescue or may be required to use emergency equipment. Training should 
be commensurate with the functions to be performed. Fire drills are recommen­
ded several times a year, depending on the size of the facility and the rate
of employee turnover.
F. PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT
Many cases have been recorded of traumatic injury, respiratory distress, and
dermal exposure to toxic and corrosive substances in grain elevators and feed 
mills. A review of the literature indicates a significant number of injuries 
could have been prevented by the use of personal protective equipment. 
Engineering and administrative controls should be used where possible as the 
primary means of protection from workplace hazards. Use of personal protec­
tive equipment is necessary, however, where known controls are not fully 
effective or while controls are being implemented [51, 58, 64-66].
Although some types of personal protective equipment are needed in most
facilities, specific requirements vary and should be determined by a qualified 
person on the basis of the facility, operations, location, and other consider­
ations of the work environment. Major concerns which may necessitate the use 
of protective equipment in grain elevators and feed mills include the chance 
of falling objects, the presence of atmospheric dust, the use of fumigants, 
and the need to enter confined spaces. Other potential hazards which should 
be evaluated include exposure to high noise levels, overhead obstructions,
temperature extremes, electrical equipment, sparks and flying objects, and
irritating, corrosive, and toxic substances [58, 64, 65].
Protective equipment should be properly maintained and inspected on a regular 
basis. Visual inspections should normally be conducted before each use, and 
more thorough scheduled inspections accomplished depending upon the equip­
ment. The type and frequency of required maintenance and inspection are 
usually available from the supplier or manufacturer or included in applicable
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OSHA standards. Written records should be kept that reflect scheduled inspec­
tion dates, inspection results, and maintenance performed. Logs should also 
be kept on limited-life items.
The employer should be responsible for the provision of adequate protective
equipment and its proper use by employees. This can more easily be 
accomplished if the workers understand the necessity for the equipment and if 
the equipment is not overly uncomfortable or cumbersome. Instruction and 
training are necessary to ensure that workers understand the limitations of
the equipment and are able to use the equipment properly.
Items normally needed to protect personnel from injury or illness include hard 
bats, safety glasses or goggles, respirators, safety belts, harnesses, and
lifelines. Other protective equipment such as ear plugs, protective footwear, 
gloves, and flotation devices may be required in some applications.
1. Head Protection
Protective headgear is needed where there is a possibility of impact from 
falling or flying objects or overhead obstructions. Specialized headgear may 
be required to protect against specific hazards such as electrical shock, 
burns, and exposure to cold weather. Headgear provided for protection from 
falling or flying objects must meet the requirements specified in 29 CFR 
1910.135 [49]. Protective headgear should be visually inspected before each 
use and repaired or replaced when cracked, chipped, or otherwise damaged.
2. Eye and Face Protection
Suitable protection is needed where there is a chance of injury from flying 
objects or exposure to irritating substances. Impact-resistant safety glasses 
or safety goggles are required where there is a chance of injury from flying 
particles, sparks, or other small objects. Optically-corrected safety glasses 
or safety goggles that can be worn over optically-corrected glasses may be 
needed for persons using corrective lenses. Safety goggles may be required 
where eye-irritating chemicals, vapors, or dusts are present. A full coverage 
face shield is needed if both the eyes and face are exposed to a hazard. Pro­
tective eye and face equipment must meet the requirements in 29 CFR 1910.133 
[49]. Persons engaged in welding and cutting operations must use goggles and 
shields in accordance with 29 CFR 1910.252 [49]. Contact lenses should not be 
worn in grain-handling or milling areas where airborne dust is present. 
Protective equipment should be visually inspected before each use for loose, 
scratched, pitted, or otherwise damaged components that may reduce protection 
or obscure vision.
3. Respiratory Protection
Appropriate respiratory protective equipment is needed whenever personnel are 
exposed to particulate, gas, or vapor contaminants exceeding the permissible 
exposure limits (PEL's), or an oxygen deficiency. The type of respiratory 
equipment used should be determined by a qualified person on the basis of the 
specific conditions and atmospheric test results. Respirators must be 
NIOSH/MSHA approved devices and be fitted, used, and maintained in accordance 
with 29 CFR 1910.134 [49].
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Dust masks for protection from particulate contaminants are the most frequent­
ly used respiratory devices in grain-bandling and grain-processing facili­
ties. Dust masks may be disposable or have a reusable frame with a disposable
filter element. Some facilities provide enclosed, forced air respiratory
devices for excessively dusty operations such as bin cleaning. Chemical
cartridge respirators are used to provide protection from low concentrations 
of known gases and vapors in areas where there is no oxygen deficiency. Sup­
plied air respirators or self-contained breathing apparatuses are needed in 
oxygen-deficient atmospheres.
4. Fall Protection
Safety belts or harnesses are needed whenever employees are required to work 
at elevated stations 6 feet or more above grade level and are not otherwise 
protected from falls [67]. The belts or harnesses should be attached to a 
secure point or other device designed to prevent uncontrolled movement.
Lanyards and lifelines should be sized or adjusted to minimize free-fall
distance consistent with freedom of movement. On vehicles such as rail cars, 
where no reasonably effective secure point exists, other means of protecting 
workers, such as providing access platforms, should be considered. Belts or
harnesses with lifelines are also needed when entering bins from above and in
other applications where their use could prevent serious injury or enhance 
re scue.
Equipment should comply with the requirements contained in American National 
Standard A10.14, "Requirements for Safety Belts, Harnesses, Lanyards, 
Lifelines, and Drop Lines for Construction and Industrial Use" [68]. Prior to 
each use, equipment should be inspected for dry rot, chemical, mechanical, or 
other damage that may affect its strength. Defective lifelines should not be
used. Care should be taken to ensure that the line is not placed over a sharp
edge, or cut or pinched.
5. Hearing Protection
Ear plugs, ear muffs, or other suitable devices are needed when workers are 
exposed to ambient sound levels exceeding the permissible exposure levels 
specified in Table G-16 of 29 CFR 1910.95 [49]. Sound level meters used to 
measure noise levels must be compatible with the environment in which they are 
used. Rotation of personnel, restricting personnel access to noisy areas, use 
of barriers and other administrative and engineering controls should be used 
where possible to limit exposure.
6. Foot Protection
Personnel exposed to potential foot injuries as the result of impact from 
falling or rolling objects should be provided with protective footwear. 
Specialized footwear may be needed to protect against specific hazards such as 
electrical shock. Protective footwear must meet the specifications set forth 
in 29 CFR 1910.136 [49].
7. Hand Protection
Protective gloves may be required to protect workers exposed to sharp or abra­
sive surfaces or irritating chemicals. The type of glove needed is dependent 
upon the specific hazard. Impervious gloves should be worn when handling
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irritating chemicals. Other specialized gloves should be worn when hands are 
exposed to hazards such as electrical shock or thermal extremes.
8. Flotation Devices
U.S. Coast Guard approved personal flotation devices are needed whenever an 
employee is exposed to danger of falls into water, such as when working on 
barges and unprotected docks. At least one 30-inch U.S. Coast Guard approved 
life ring with not less than 90 feet of line attached is required on docks, in 
the vicinity of barges or vessels, and in other locations where employees work 
near water (29 CFR 1926.106) [69].
G. SAFE WORK PRACTICES
1. Dust Control
A comprehensive dust-control program is central to the control of fires and 
explosions in grain-handling and grain-processing facilities. Grain dust 
explosions can occur in enclosed areas whenever airborne dust concentrations 
are within certain limits and an ignition source is present. Good design and 
management can reduce the chance of a source of ignition being present. In 
practice, however, all potential sources of ignition cannot be completely 
eliminated. The exclusion of sources of ignition cannot be relied upon as the 
sole method of protection against explosion [2, 19, 25, 70].
Dust control can be achieved by various methods. For this reason, a require­
ment to use a specific method of dust control is not appropriate. Rather, a 
comprehensive dust-control program should be developed by a qualified person 
on the basis of the specific conditions at the facility. An effective dust- 
control program must address both airborne and layered dust. Although they
may be considered separately, airborne and layered dust are complementary. 
Layered dust cannot be adequately controlled if airborne dust levels are 
excessive. Dust concentrations at grain transfer points and within handling 
and processing equipment should be maintained below the lower explosive
limit. Airborne dust control should be such that, in conjunction with
housekeeping activities, layered dust levels do not become excessive such that 
if made airborne the concentration would not exceed the lower explosive
limit. In addition, when workers are present, exposure to airborne dust 
levels must be limited in accordance with the requirements contained in 
29 CFR 1910.1000 [49].
Good housekeeping is probably the single most important factor in reducing the 
risks associated with secondary grain dust explosions. Even with effective 
airborne dust controls, some dust will escape and settle on floors, equipment, 
ledges, and other surfaces. Burning dust can cause a serious fire, or if 
disturbed, can initiate an explosion. In addition, dust accumulations can 
provide the fuel for extremely destructive secondary explosions. In many 
cases, a relatively minor primary explosion has been followed by a series of 
devastating secondary explosions fueled by layered dust thrown into suspension 
by the shock of previous explosions [19, 25, 53, 71, 72]. This layered dust 
need not be in open areas but may be hidden within bins and equipment. 
Although the value of good housekeeping should be recognized throughout the 
industry, there is no consensus of what constitutes a clean plant. Several 
sources, including the Canadian Grain Handling Association and Factory Mutual 
Research Corporation, recommend that layered dust levels should not exceed 1/8 
inch, with the provision that every effort be made to do better [53, 71, 72].
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Although the 1/8-inch limit, if maintained, would improve cleanliness levels 
in many facilities, it is considered excessive since dust accumulations as 
little as 1/64 inch could support secondary explosions if uniformly dispersed 
into the air [2, 21, 25, 73]. Because of the importance attributed to
cleanup, it is recommended that thorough cleanup of floors, stairs, ledges, 
girders, machinery, spouting, and other surfaces within grain-handling and 
grain-processing areas where dust may accumulate be accomplished at least 
daily. The National Academy of Sciences [2] recommends, as a guideline, that 
layered dust in each gallery, tunnel, and workhouse not exceed 1/64 inch and 
if made airborne the concentration would not exceed 40 g/m^ (0.04 oz/ft^) 
for the total volume of the area. Grain spills would not be considered when 
using this guideline, only material that will pass through a 200-mesh screen 
(74 microns or smaller in diameter). Emphasis should be placed on cleanup of 
layered dust on motors, generators, bearings, and other heat-generating 
equipment and warm surfaces. In facilities where significant amounts of dust 
accumulate during a workday, daily cleanup may not be adequate, and additional 
dust cleanup should be provided, concurrent with operations [53]. When 
possible, dust should be cleaned up whenever visible tracks are recognized. 
The housekeeping program should address hidden, as well as visible dust. 
Layered dust within enclosures, and in other areas which are not easily 
accessible should be cleaned at regular intervals as determined by a qualified 
person. Daily housekeeping should be supplemented by periodic facility 
shutdown and thorough cleanup, including washing down where possible. These 
thorough cleanups should be accomplished at least yearly.
The method of dust cleanup should minimize generation of airborne dust. The 
most effective way to accomplish this is to use a central vacuum system. 
Portable vacuum systems can be used, but they are usually less efficient and 
can be difficult to maneuver around equipment. Vacuums should be acceptable 
for use in Class II, Group G, locations [74]. Vacuum cleaning systems are 
preferred for removal of static dust on surfaces in order to prevent 
resuspension of the dust in the air as is caused by brushing down with brooms 
or using compressed air ("blowing down") [2, 74]. If brooms are used for
cleaning layered dust, they should be soft, and generation of excessive 
airborne dust should be avoided. If compressed air is used in facilities for 
"blowing down" surfaces and equipment which are not otherwise easily 
accessible, this must be done only after shutting down and isolating or 
locking out energy to equipment in the area and eliminating other possible 
ignition sources. Cleaning with compressed air should only be used to remove 
light films of dust where other means are not possible [75]. Sweeping dust 
from tops of equipment or ledges requires similar precautions if resulting 
airborne dust levels are within or near explosive limits.
Housekeeping considerations, such as minimizing horizontal ledges and blind or 
inaccessible areas, should be included in the facility design. Techniques 
such as the addition of sloped flashings to ledges can be used in existing 
facilities.
Airborne dust levels can be controlled by various techniques. Pneumatic 
dust-collection systems, when properly designed, maintained, and operated, 
effectively control dust levels at conveyor transfer points, distributors, 
cleaners, and other areas of turbulence [76]. Pneumatic systems use bag
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filters and cyclone separators, although cyclones are not being used in most 
new applications because they discharge some of the finer dust into the atmos­
phere. Cyclones are sometimes used in conjunction with bag filters to reduce 
the amount of dust collected in the filters. Although this can be effective, 
the setup is more complicated and less energy efficient. Removal of the 
larger particles in the cyclone may also contribute to clogging of the bag 
filters. Bag collectors and dust storage units should be vented or located 
outside the facility away from personnel to reduce their exposure to the 
explosion hazard.
Guidelines for the safe design, operation, and maintenance of pneumatic 
dust-collection systems are contained in the NAS report, "Pneumatic Dust 
Control in Grain Elevators: Guidelines for Design Operation and Maintenance,
NMAB 367-3" [76]. Inspection, servicing, and maintenance of dust-control
equipment should be accomplished on a regular basis. Handling and processing 
equipment should not be operated unless the associated dust-collection systems 
are also operating properly. Provisions for monitoring pressure at accessible 
locations in dust collectors are recommended to aid in verification of proper 
system operation. Pressure taps on branch ducts can be used to verify proper 
air velocity within the ducts.
Use of enclosed equipment, such as auger and drag conveyors, is effective in 
reducing airborne dust levels. In addition, enclosed belt conveyors are used 
in some facilities. However, enclosed equipment can pose a substantial explo­
sion hazard if internal suspended dust levels exceed the lower explosive limit 
or if excessive dust deposits accumulate within the enclosure.
Ducts, spouts, and equipment casings should be dust tight. Access and inspec­
tion doors on bins, conveyors, bucket elevators, mixers, and other 
dust-producing equipment should be designed to be dust tight and should be 
kept closed when not in use. Other effective means of reducing airborne dust 
levels include speed reduction and the use of deeper troughs on belt con­
veyors, speed reduction and the use of larger capacity buckets on bucket 
elevators, the use of choke feeding at discharge points, the use of pressuri- 
zation systems, the use of air aspiration systems, and the use of venting 
systems on scales, garners, and bins.
The hazards associated with returning collected dust to the grain are widely 
debated. Some individuals and organizations argue that limiting réintroduc­
tion of dust will not eliminate the explosion problem, since not all of the 
dust is removed from the grain and repeated handling generates additional dust 
[60, 77]. Other organizations recommend complete removal of all collected
dust from the facility, a practice followed in grain elevators in Australia 
[75]. A strict dust control program, including the practice of not returning 
dust to the grain stream at any stage, and efforts in removing the possibility 
of ignition sources are thought to be the major reasons that Western Australia 
has not had a grain dust explosion over the past 50 years [78]. Their 
relative success compared to the United States may partly depend on the
smaller number of facilities, the smaller volumes of grain handled, and the
types of grain handled [1].
The U.S. Department of Agriculture believes that this single practice of not 
returning dust to the grain stream could significantly reduce the magnitude of 
the current explosion problem. Dust collected in bag filters usually contains 
a high percentage of very fine particles at reduced moisture content, which is 
easier to ignite and potentially more destructive. Since removal of this
fine, artificially dried dust should alleviate the problems [1, 54, 60, 74],
dust should not be reintroduced to the grain stream in grain elevators where
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it may be rehandled in the facility. Dust should never be reintroduced in 
areas of high turbulence, such as the boot pits of bucket elevators, where 
dust may be thrown into suspension.
2. Hot Work
Facility modifications and equipment repair frequently require welding and 
cutting in grain elevators and feed mills. These operations are potentially 
the most hazardous. Hot work has accounted for more fires and explosions in 
grain-handling facilities than any other known cause [1]. The extremely high 
temperatures and sparks generated during welding and cutting operations dic­
tate the need for strict controls. Use of a permit system is one effective 
control measure [52, 60, 79-82]. Permits are needed for all hot work perfor­
med outside of designated maintenance areas to ensure necessary precautions 
have been taken. Hot work permits should be used for welding, cutting, 
brazing, soldering, grinding, using explosive-actuated tools, and any other 
operations which could produce high amounts of heat or energy.
The permit provides written authorization of a supervisor or other qualified 
person for performing the work. It is signed only after the work site has 
been inspected and it has been verified that the necessary precautions have 
been taken. The permit is also signed by the persons performing the work and 
by support personnel to indicate that they are aware of the potential hazards 
and safe work practices that should be followed. It is particularly important 
that contractors follow the permit requirements since they may not be familiar 
with the fire and explosion hazard in grain-handling and grain-processing 
facilities [19, 53, 60]. Prior to issuing a permit, the supervisor or quali­
fied person should determine whether the work can reasonably be moved to a 
designated maintenance area or a nonhazardous area outside the facility. 
Alternate methods such as the use of hand saws or bolt fasteners may also 
minimize or eliminate the need for hot work. Although these alternate tech­
niques are not always practical, they should be considered and evaluated prior 
to issuing the permit [53, 60, 79].
The expiration time for permits is not normally addressed in the literature. 
Some sources imply that a permit should be issued for each specific job. 
Others indicate that the permit should be renewed daily or at the beginning of 
each shift. Since a major intent of the permit is to verify that the operator 
is familiar with the hazards and the safety precautions, it is recommended 
that the permit be renewed at the beginning of each shift.
Personnel performing welding, cutting, or other hot work should be properly 
instructed and qualified to operate the equipment and be made aware of the 
hazards and associated safe work practices. Carelessness or lack of knowledge 
of the danger of dust explosions by the person performing the work has 
resulted in many explosions [82, 83]. Workers should receive training in
proper use, maintenance and inspection of welding equipment, ventilation 
requirements, and requirements for protective equipment. Where work is 
accomplished in hazardous areas such as in confined spaces, in areas 
containing combustible materials, or on elevated work platforms, additional 
training is needed to cover the specific safe work practices. Outside 
contractors should be instructed on the specific fire and explosion hazards 
that they may encounter in grain-handling facilities.
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Special precautions are necessary when there is an exposure to an area that 
has a hazard classification of Class II, Group G [3, 53, 60, 79, 81].
Complete shutdown of the facility prior to conducting any hot work in these 
areas is recommended. Where the entire facility cannot reasonably be shut 
down, dust-producing operations must be terminated within the work area and in 
adjacent areas where airborne dust could reach the work area. Necessary pre­
cautions, sucb as lockout techniques, must be taken to prevent inadvertent 
startup of equipment while it is being worked on or where airborne dust could 
be produced. Equipment should remain off until the hot work has been com­
pleted and cooled, the area has been inspected for residual heat and smolder­
ing fires, and the equipment has been approved for restart.
Combustible materials within 35 feet of the work area must be removed (29 CFR 
1910.252) [49]. When materials cannot reasonably be removed, they must be
protected by fire-resistant shields or covers. Wetting of combustible
materials in the area is recommended as an additional precaution. Care should
be taken to protect combustibles sucb as plastic spout liners, leg belts, and 
cups which pose special problems since they may be concealed from view. 
Floors, ledges, and other surfaces within 35 feet of the hot work area must be 
thoroughly cleaned of dust and debris (29 CFR 1910.252) [49]. When hot work
is elevated, the area under this, accounting for the wind draft of the slag 
and sparks, should be similarly cleaned. Cleanup should include removal of 
dust in overhead areas that could be disturbed during the hot work operation. 
Where hot work is performed on or near equipment or ducts, the interiors
should be thoroughly cleaned or protected from high temperatures. Where hot
work is performed near walls or floors, adjacent areas should also be 
inspected and cleaned. Wall, floor and other openings must be sealed where 
sparks or slag may reach.
A standby person with fire-extinguishing equipment is needed to monitor the 
area while the hot work is being performed and for at least 1/2 hour after 
cessation of the hot work. Additional checks up to 2 hours or more are recom­
mended. A thorough inspection of the work area and adjacent areas should be 
made for residual heat and smoldering fires before the standby person leaves. 
If a security guard is employed during nonoperating hours, be or she should be 
advised that hot work has taken place.
Welding, cutting, and brazing equipment should be used in accordance with the 
manufacturers' instructions. Personnel must be provided with proper eye pro­
tection and other necessary protective equipment. Mechanical ventilation 
should be provided as necessary. Operations and equipment must comply with 
the requirements contained in 29 CFR 1910.252 [49].
3. Smoking, Open Flames, and Hot Surfaces
Flames are potent sources of ignition for dust suspensions [84]. Since flames 
can ignite dust suspensions and smoldering materials are easily converted into 
flames, it is universally agreed that smoking, smoking materials, or open 
flames should not be allowed in grain-handling, grain-storage, and grain- 
processing areas, or in immediately adjacent areas [23, 36, 60, 63, 85, 86].
Smoking may be permitted in areas specifically designated by management and 
isolated from ignition-susceptible areas, such as pressurized control rooms, 
which are free of dust and other flammables and combustibles. Although some 
sources recommend that smoking be completely banned within facilities, there
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is no evidence to indicate that smoking within dust-free areas designated by 
management presents a significant hazard. Smoking and nonsmoking areas should 
be clearly marked and smoking rules must be strictly enforced.
Heating equipment should be suitable for the location in which it is used. 
Other exposed surface temperatures of heated devices, including steam pipes, 
hot water pipes, and hot air ducts, should be kept below 71°C (160°F) [74].
4. Inspection and Maintenance
Workers in grain elevators and feed mills can receive injuries as a direct 
result of equipment failures. In addition, a significant number of dust fires 
and explosions in these facilities have been attributed to machinery malfunc­
tions. A program of periodic surveillance and preventive maintenance is a 
necessary and effective means of keeping equipment and machinery functioning 
properly and reducing the number of unplanned failures [23, 55, 60, 63, 87-89].
A program of regular surveillance and preventive maintenance should be imple­
mented at all plants to facilitate uninterrupted and safe operations. As a 
minimum, a program is needed for safety equipment, emergency equipment, and 
operational equipment where a malfunction could result in a direct injury or 
cause a fire, explosion, or other hazardous condition.
Inspection and maintenance requirements vary widely between facilities. 
Specific requirements should be established by a qualified person who is 
familiar with the facility, the equipment, and its use. Requirements should 
follow manufacturers' recommendations, although some modifications may be 
required depending upon the specific use environment of the equipment. All 
safety and emergency equipment such as fire extinguishers, hoses, standpipes, 
lifelines, and emergency ladders should be inspected periodically. Other 
equipment and components requiring periodic inspection and maintenance in 
grain elevators and feed mills include bucket elevators, grain dryers, 
grinders, dust-collection systems, conveyors, cleaners and scalpers, bearings, 
drive belts, manlifts and passenger elevators, powered vehicles, and 
electrical equipment. Inspection and maintenance should be performed at 
regularly scheduled intervals. Where normal nonoperating periods do not 
accommodate maintenance planning, scheduled periods of downtime should be 
allocated [52, 54, 55, 88, 89].
Recordkeeping requirements also vary between facilities. Written records are 
normally needed to ensure that necessary inspection and maintenance have been 
planned and are accomplished as scheduled. A list of equipment, including 
inspection and maintenance requirements, is needed to properly plan and imple­
ment a preventive maintenance program. Records maintained on the equipment 
should include the date, maintenance performed, and/or the results of the 
inspection. Records of equipment failures should also be maintained in order 
to identify possible deficiencies in inspection and maintenance planning. 
Many programs include work-order systems to provide a record of maintenance 
performed. Personnel should be instructed to report any abnormal equipment 
operations when detected; however, this practice should be used to supplement 
a maintenance program, not replace it [51, 55, 60, 63, 87-89]. Inspection and 
maintenance should be performed only by trained and authorized personnel.
51
5. Confined Spaces
Entry into confined spaces such as grain bins, hoppers, and other storage 
tanks is frequently required for cleaning, inspection or maintenance. The 
inherent dangers associated with confined spaces clearly indicate the need for 
stridt control measures. According to the literature [42, 44, 45, 61, 90-93], 
the development of sound procedures, including the use of a permit system, is 
a very effective method of attaining control.
Procedures should be developed and implemented whenever workers are required 
to enter bins or other confined spaces. The procedures should include pre­
entry preparation, entry, exit, work performed in the confined space, and 
emergency operations. Procedures for confined space entry may vary widely 
depending on the type and location of the confined space and the work to be 
performed. Procedures should be specifically designed for each type of entry.
The permit provides written authorization for entering and working in confined 
spaces, and clearly indicates the precautions which should be taken to ensure 
the safety of the worker. The permit should include the location and descrip­
tion of the work to be performed, hazards that may be encountered, results of 
atmospheric testing, precautionary measures, and safety and protective equip­
ment required. The permit should be signed by a supervisor or other qualified 
person, the persons performing the work, and support personnel. Prior to 
signing the permit, it should be determined that the entry requirements have 
been met and necessary actions have been accomplished. Although permits may 
vary throughout the industry, they serve the same purpose; i.e., to ensure the 
safety of the worker.
One primary hazard associated with confined space entry is the possibility of 
atmospheric contaminants. Toxic contaminants may exist where pesticides or 
fumigants have been used. Composition changes in stored products may, over a 
period of time, reduce the oxygen content below safe levels or generate toxic 
materials. The need for atmospheric evaluation prior to confined space entry 
is reflected throughout the literature [42, 44, 45, 61, 90-93].
Confined spaces should be thoroughly ventilated prior to entry. Openings 
should remain open while the confined space is occupied to provide continuous 
ventilation. Forced air ventilation, where available, should continue when 
workers are in confined spaces, unless prevented by conditions such as exces­
sive dust levels. Atmospheric testing is needed to ensure that the atmosphere 
is safe. Testing is needed to determine oxygen content, flammability, and 
presence of toxic materials [44]. If reduced oxygen levels or other harmful 
substances exist, additional ventilation may be provided to obtain acceptable 
levels. If safe levels cannot be obtained, entry should not be made unless 
appropriate respiratory protective equipment is worn.
Another major hazard associated with storage vessels is entrapment in flowing 
grain, which can lead to suffocation of personnel. Release of bridged materi­
als or materials adhering to sides of containers has resulted in many fatali­
ties. Some grains act like quicksand and a person can sink rapidly. The 
danger is much greater if the material is being drawn from the bottom of the 
bin. Confined spaces should be inspected for suspended materials prior to 
entry. Personnel should never work at levels below suspended material or 
while standing on materials which could break loose and bury them. Materials
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should not be fed into or drawn from bins which are occupied. Fill and dis­
charge equipment, as well as equipment inside the confined space, should be 
isolated or locked out whenever inadvertent operation could create a hazard. 
Notification of personnel in control rooms and on all work levels that inter­
face with the confined space should be included in the procedures [45, 61, 90, 
94, 95]. Many fatalities in confined spaces can be directly attributed to a 
lack of communication with outside workers. Provisions for a standby person 
continuously monitoring workers in the confined space, and the use of proper 
protective equipment, including lifelines, provide further protection for the 
worker [44, 45, 61, 90-94]. The standby person and necessary rescue equipment 
should always be stationed outside the confined space when it is occupied. 
The standby person should have continuous communication capability with the 
workers in the confined space and be able to summon additional assistance if 
necessary. The standby person should not enter the confined space until ade­
quate assistance is present and appropriate precautions are taken to prevent 
the rescuers from becoming disabled.
Necessary protective equipment, as determined by the qualified person, should 
be provided for workers in the confined space. Safety belts or harnesses with 
lanyards are needed in all applications where harmful atmospheres may exist. 
Safety harnesses are preferred. In many cases a safety belt would not properly 
support an individual in an upright position to permit removal of the individ­
ual from a typical silo or bin opening or other narrow opening. Respiratory 
equipment is needed where harmful atmospheres may exist. Air-supplied respir­
atory equipment is required if the oxygen level is below 19.5% [44]. Other 
protective equipment and clothing may also be needed. Hard hats are needed 
whenever there is a possibility of items falling into an occupied confined 
space.
Personnel who are required to work in a confined space or in support of those 
working in a confined space should be trained to recognize the hazards and 
know the safe work practices associated with entering, working in, and exiting 
that area. Personnel should receive training in normal and emergency entry 
and exit procedures; proper use of respirators, lifelines and harnesses, and 
other required protective equipment; isolation and lockout procedures; atmos­
pheric testing requirements and procedures; purging and ventilating proce­
dures; communications and emergency signals; and other safe work practices 
associated with the specific location, type and function of the confined space 
and the operation to be performed. Personnel who work in the vicinity of con­
fined spaces should be aware of the associated hazards.
Equipment required to support operations in confined spaces, including boat­
swain's chairs, winches, protective equipment, and rescue equipment, should be 
inspected prior to use to ensure the equipment is in good condition. All 
equipment should be approved for the atmosphere in which it is to be used.
6. Isolation and Lockouts
Many accidents occur when energy is inadvertently applied to equipment that is 
being worked on. Energy isolation is needed during maintenance and repair 
activities to prevent worker injuries from unwanted startup of machinery, 
application of electrical energy to electrical lines or components, or other 
inadvertent application or release of energy. Accidents occurring under these 
circumstances frequently result in serious injury or death. Use of isolation 
and lockout procedures is a proven safety technique which should be used in
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all facilities to prevent injuries during maintenance, repair, servicing, 
inspection, cleaning, troubleshooting, and other similar activities [41, 51,
58, 61, 65, 96, 97]. Documented procedures ensure that the isolation
technique is clearly defined and uniformly applied. Verification by a 
supervisor or other qualified person further ensures that the procedures are 
correctly applied and the isolation technique has been effective in isolating 
and/or dissipating hazardous energy. 2
For isolation procedures to be effective, energy should be isolated or blocked 
at a point or points of control that cannot be bypassed. The point of control 
should be secured by a device or technique which prevents unauthorized persons 
from reenergizing the equipment or machinery. Stored energy that constitutes 
a personnel hazard should be dissipated or blocked. Key-type padlocks are 
normally used in grain elevators and feed mills and are recommended for 
securing energy control points. Other techniques such as use of tags alone
are successfully used in some industries; however, these techniques rely 
heavily on highly trained and experienced personnel, controlled access, and 
other procedural techniques not easily achievable in grain-handling and grain- 
processing facilities.
Key-type padlocks, when properly used, provide positive protection and can be
applied in most cases where isolation is required. Padlocks should be
fastened and removed only by the person performing the maintenance task. Keys
should be issued only to the employee performing the task, and should be kept 
on his or her person at all times. When two or more employees are engaged in 
an operation that requires a lockout, each individual should have his or her 
own lock which has been installed in such a manner that the isolation device 
cannot be removed until each employee has removed his or her own lock.
Electrical isolation can be achieved by locking circuit breakers and/or main 
disconnects in the "OFF" position. Where more than one switch or disconnect 
supplies power to equipment, multiple padlocks are needed. Mechanical
isolation of moving parts can be achieved by disconnecting linkages, removing 
drive belts, or using chains. It may be necessary to block or chain moving 
mechanical parts to prevent rotation, in addition to electrically isolating
the equipment. Potential energy sources such as compressed springs and pneu­
matic and hydraulic pressure should be recognized and controlled by isolating, 
blocking, or otherwise neutralizing the energy. After the isolation procedure 
has been completed, an attempt should be made to operate the machinery or
otherwise verify that the lockout device has been effectively applied. Any
controls or switches operated during this verification should be returned to 
the "OFF" position.
Inspection, servicing, or troubleshooting should not be performed on operating 
equipment or machinery unless it can be determined that hazards are controlled
with the energy present. Hazards should be evaluated by a qualified person and
procedures should be developed which adequately control those hazards. 
Protective equipment and other special equipment needed should be included as 
part of this procedure.
All workers should receive general instruction on the equipment, operations, 
and types of energy isolation required at the facility. Specific lockout pro­
cedures, devices, and techniques should be addressed as applicable. Training
should be sufficient to enable an employee to recognize the sources of energy
which should be isolated, apply the isolation techniques properly, and
54
recognize responsibilities with respect to equipment which has been isolated 
by other employees. Retraining should be accomplished as necessary to 
maintain proficiency and whenever procedu es are modified.
7. Machine Guards
Machinery with rapidly moving external components are used in most grain 
elevators and feed mills. Unguarded nip points, shafts, sprockets, wheel 
drive mechanisms, and other moving parts are common hazards which have been 
responsible for many serious injuries. Many of the injuries would not have 
occurred if adequate guards had been provided. Requirements for guards vary 
widely and should be established by a qualified person on the basis of the 
specific configuration and location of the equipment in the facility. The 
exact configuration of the guard or barrier is not critical, as long as it 
covers or restricts access to moving parts in such a manner that they cannot 
be contacted [4, 51, 52, 54, 61, 65, 96].
Safeguards should be provided wherever there is a chance of personnel injury 
from contact with power transmission drives such as chain, belt, and rope 
drives; rotating shafts and sprockets such as those on bucket elevators, 
grinders, mixers, and trippers; nip points such as those occurring at the main 
pulleys on belt conveyors; and other rotating or translating machinery parts. 
Fixed or portable auger conveyors should never be operated without guards. 
Point of operation guarding should be provided for equipment such as sewing 
machines. Consideration should also be given to guarding heavily loaded lines 
and ropes such as those used in rail car pullers, where breakage could result 
in serious injury.
Complete enclosure of moving components is the preferred method of guarding, 
although guarding may be accomplished by the use of fences or barricades or by 
location of equipment in areas that are inaccessible to employees. When 
guarding by barricades or location is used, necessary precautions should be 
taken to prevent employees from entering areas where equipment is located. 
Guards designed and installed by equipment manufacturers are usually the most 
effective and should be specified where possible. When guards are built
in-house, a major consideration should be ease of installation and removal. 
Guards should be removed only by trained and authorized personnel after neces­
sary precautions such as equipment shutdown and lockout have been taken to
minimize the chance of injury. Guards should comply with the requirements 
contained in 29 CFR 1910 Subpart 0 [49].
8. Labeling and Posting
Signs and labels are necessary to inform both workers and visitors of hazard­
ous conditions in the workplace and precautions to be taken to prevent 
accidents. Although the use of accident prevention signs is infrequently men­
tioned in the literature, it is among the most widely used safety measures 
throughout industry [51]. Signs and/or labels should be provided whenever 
failure to recognize the condition could result in an unsafe action.
To be effective, signs should be concise, yet easily understood, and readily 
visible to persons entering or working in the area where the hazard exists.
Persons unable to read or understand signs or labels should be informed of the
hazardous condition reflected and associated instructions. When a significant
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number of workers read languages other than English, consideration should be 
given to printing signs both in English and the predominant language of the 
non-English-reading workers. Established symbols should be used whenever 
possible.
Signs needed in grain elevators and feed mills vary depending on the applica­
tion. Recommendations should be established by a qualified person. Signs are 
normally used to designate (1) areas where specific practices such as smoking 
and hot work are prohibited, (2) areas where protective equipment is needed, 
(3) areas where combustible, flammable, and toxic materials are used or 
stored, (4) areas to which access is restricted, (5) special precautions or 
instructions needed for safe operation of vehicles, machinery, or equipment 
such as manlifts, (6) emergency evacuation routes and location of building 
exits (exits used only for emergencies should be designated), and (7) location 
of safety-related items such as first aid and fire fighting equipment.
Facilities should be inspected periodically to determine if signs or labels 
have been removed or have become illegible, or additional signs are necessary 
because of facility, equipment, or operational changes. Specifications for 
accident prevention signs and tags are contained in 29 CFR 1910.145 [49].
9. Other Safe Work Practices
a. Lightning Protection
Lightning has been reported as the probable cause for some dust explosions in 
grain-handling and grain-processing facilities [1]. Facilities in areas ex­
posed to a substantial risk from lightning should have a lightning protection 
system. Guidelines for risk assessment and installation of lightning protec­
tion systems are contained in NFPA 78, "Lightning Protection Code" [98].
b. Foreign Material
Foreign objects such as tramp metal, stones and wood are frequently found in 
grain and feed stock. Introduction of these materials into the facility can 
produce sparks within the equipment. In addition, larger materials may jam 
between buckets and the casing in bucket elevators, causing sparks, frictional 
heating, or equipment damage that could contribute to an explosion. Allen and 
Calcote [99] reported that a shower of metal sparks of sufficient energy, such 
as might occur in continuous, high-speed grinding operations, could ignite an 
explosive dust cloud. It was not determined, however, whether sporadic or 
occasional sparking incidents would cause ignition. Although the degree of 
risk associated with sparks arising from impact is not fully defined, most 
sources recommend that precautionary measures be taken to remove foreign 
materials that may result in generation of sparks [23, 60, 62, 63, 72, 84,
100].
Several methods are commonly used to minimize the entry of foreign material 
into handling and processing equipment. In grain elevators, the main con­
sideration is minimizing the amount of foreign material entering the grain- 
handling equipment, primarily bucket elevators, where most primary explosions 
in these facilities occur. Grates or screens are frequently used in receiving 
areas to remove materials that may be contained in the grain or feed. 
Although gratings do not remove all foreign materials, they are effective in 
removing larger materials regardless of composition. The spacing of a grating
56
should be as small as possible consistent with the commodity being handled. 
Spacing of 1 1/2 inches is often recommended [100, 101]. Some facilities,
however, require a spacing of 2 1/2 inches or more to accommodate special 
handling rates [102]. It is recommended that the receiving leg feeds be 
protected by a grate where the greater dimension is less than the cup 
projection and the lesser dimension is 1/2 the cup projection [2].
Magnets are used in many receiving areas to remove ferrous materials that may 
pass through the screens or grates. Although magnets do not always extract 
all ferrous materials entrained in the grain stream, medium and large-sized 
materials can be removed with high efficiency when magnets are properly 
selected, installed, and maintained. Although the best protection is achieved 
by the use of both gratings and magnets, magnets cannot be easily accommodated 
in many existing facilities and are not considered essential if other effec­
tive means of protecting against the entry of foreign materials are used.
In feed mills or grain elevators where equipment for grinding, pulverizing, 
and similar operations is used, additional precautions are needed [23, 63, 84, 
85, 102], Statistics indicate that hammer mills, roller mills, and other
equipment where impact is part of the operation are second only to bucket 
elevators as the location of primary explosions [1]. Multiple magnets are 
used in some applications to remove ferrous materials, with feeding spouts 
arranged so that the materials pass over the magnets at low speeds. Pneumatic 
separators, gravity separators, and scalpers are also used upstream of 
grinders to effectively remove foreign materials. When screening-type devices 
are used, they should be designed to exclude from the processing machinery all 
foreign material (that may result in generation of sparks) larger than the 
grain being processed. Equipment used to collect or separate foreign 
materials should be kept in good repair and cleaned regularly.
c. Walking/Working Areas
Slips and falls traditionally have accounted for a high percentage of injuries 
in grain elevators and feed mills [17]. A significant number of the work 
injuries can be attributed to slippery or uneven footing. Good housekeeping 
and care of walking and working surfaces are necessary to reduce the number of 
injuries [4, 43, 103, 104]. Work areas should be kept free of debris which 
could cause slips, trips, falls, fires, or other accidents. Debris, such as 
lumber with protruding nails, should not be allowed to accumulate in receiving 
areas. Grain, grain dust, moisture, and ice can also cause serious accidents 
unless cleaned up or cleared as soon as possible.
Falls from heights usually result in more serious injuries than those that 
occur on the same level. These can normally be prevented by covering or 
guarding openings in floors, walls, and work platforms which are accessible to 
workers [61, 65]. Bins and other containers with floor openings should be
kept covered when not being used. Where operational considerations such as 
the use of automated trippers dictate that bins be open continuously, other 
forms of protection and/or special procedures should be established for use by 
personnel required to work in those areas. Grating inserts are successfully 
used in many facilities to prevent falls into bins and distributor floor 
openings.
Floors, stairs, doors, ramps, and walkways should be kept in good repair and 
kept clear to provide unimpeded egress. At least two means of emergency
escape should be provided from all general work areas normally occupied by 
personnel. Escape routes should be separated to the extent that a single
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event will not reasonably prevent access to all means of escape. Exits should 
be clearly marked. Other general requirements for means of egress are 
contained in 29 CFR 1910 Subpart E [49]. Specific recommendations for egress 
in grain elevators are contained in NFPA 101, "Code for Safety to Life from 
Fire in Buildings and Structures" [105].
d. Static Electricity
The magnitude of the hazard associated with static electricity in grain eleva­
tors and feed mills is not clearly defined. Although it is known that elec­
trostatic charges are generated in the processing, transportation, and general 
handling of dusts, static electricity has never been proven to have caused a 
grain elevator explosion. One suspected case in a grain mill involved static 
discharges in a pneumatic conveying system. The statistical data are incon­
clusive, however, since the ignition source in over 40 percent of the reported 
explosions is unknown [1], and the presence of static electricity is difficult 
to trace following an explosion.
The extent of problems associated with electrostatic charges has been the sub­
ject of numerous investigations; however, valid predictions for practical 
applications have not been made. Dahn [106] found that although grain can 
accumulate moderate amounts of electrostatic charges when moving across spouts 
and chutes, such charges dissipate quickly when the grain comes into contact 
with a device or structure that is well grounded. It was also noted that if 
equipment is poorly grounded or isolated from ground, a potentially hazardous 
situation might quickly develop. The approach suggested by most professional
sources is to assume that static charges will be generated; therefore, pre­
cautions should be taken to minimize the hazard [23, 60, 61, 63, 72, 84, 85]. 
Palmer [84] indicates that dusts with a minimum ignition energy of less than 
25 millijoules should be regarded as prone to ignition by static electricity. 
This value is near the lower end of the ignition energy range usually attribu­
ted to grain dusts, suggesting that static electricity is a possible, but not 
a major source of ignition.
The primary areas of concern in grain-handling and grain-processing facilities 
are pneumatic conveyors and bucket elevators. Necessary precautions for these 
conveying systems include electrical bonding and grounding of frames and cas­
ings [23, 60, 61, 63, 72, 85]. Similar precautions are recommended on high
speed continuous belt conveyors, although the problem is less significant if 
airborne dust levels are maintained below the lower explosive limit. Slow 
moving continuous belt systems such as those used for personnel transport
(manlifts) or transport of bagged materials are not normally considered a 
problem. Use of electrically conductive belting is recommended by many
sources; however, there is no agreement on the degree of conductivity.
Studies have indicated that use of a conductive belt, in conjunction with a 
well grounded frame, safely dissipates static charges. Belts with the highest 
conductivity, however, can produce the highest spark discharge energy level in 
an ungrounded system [107]. For this reason, no specific recommendations are 
made relative to the use of electrically conductive conveyor belt material. 
When conductive belts are used, it is essential that a conductive path be pro­
vided from the belt to a well grounded frame. Usually, metal pulleys will
pick up a charge from the belt and communicate that charge to the supporting 
shaft and through bearings to the equipment frame without special provisions. 
However, conditions such as the use of nonconductive lagging or bearing lubri­
cants, or isolated frame sections may prevent components from being electri­
cally common. Static collectors are also used in some facilities to remove
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electrostatic charges from conveyor systems. Guidelines for electrically 
bonding, grounding and using static collectors are contained in NFPA 77, 
"Recommended Practice on Static Electricity" [108].
e. Hazardous Materials Storage
Toxic materials, explosives, flammable and combustible fluids, and gases and 
other hazardous materials should be stored in suitable containers with their 
contents clearly identified. Hazardous materials should be stored outside the 
facility in detached buildings or approved tanks.
H. EQUIPMENT AND TOOLS
I. Bucket Elevators
Statistics indicate that bucket elevators are by far the most hazardous equip­
ment, with respect to dust explosions, found in grain-handling and 
grain-processing facilities [1, 2].
More primary explosions have occurred in bucket elevators than in any other 
known location. Investigations have indicated that elevator legs routinely
contain amounts of dust which exceed the lower explosive limit [2, 109].
Intense heat can be generated on the drive pulley in the event of belt stall­
ing. Belts may burn through and drop into the leg, resulting in ignition of 
dust from burning fragments or from sparks generated by metal components 
striking the casing [23, 60, 109, 110].
Bucket elevators should be located outside the facility where possible. In 
bucket elevators, belt speed monitoring devices are needed to detect belt and 
pulley slowdown and to allow corrective action to be taken before frictional
heating ignites the belt or grain [60, 61, 102, 109-111]. When the bucket
elevator speed drops below a predetermined value, the slowdown detection 
device should activate an alarm, initiate stoppage of the supply of material 
to the bucket elevator, and cut off power to the elevator drive motor. The 
best method of detecting slippage is to monitor the drive and tail pulleys for 
variations in the speed ratio. Since operating speed is nearly constant in 
most cases, simple devices which monitor belt and pulley speed are usually 
adequate. Manual shutdown can be accomplished or it can be done automatically 
by sending a signal to a device which turns off power to the drive motors. To 
prevent unnecessary shutdowns, a 30-second time delay may be incorporated into 
the system to allow the bucket elevator to attempt to clear after the supply 
of material to the elevator has been stopped. If shutdown is to be accom­
plished manually, procedural controls should be established to ensure that 
corrective action is taken in a timely manner. Necessary procedural controls 
include having a worker continuously stationed in the vicinity of the elevator 
controls and in a location where the alarm can be detected at all times. The 
worker should be instructed to shut down the bucket elevator immediately or 
after a short time delay to give the equipment a chance to clear.
The exact setting of the slowdown detection device is dependent on the speci­
fic application. Typically, speed reductions from 5% to 20% of normal opera­
ting speed indicate a significant problem [71, 109, 112]. For most applica­
tions, a setting of 5% to 10% of normal operating speed is adequate to detect 
malfunctions without causing accidental tripping during normal operations. 
The slowdown detection device should be fail-safe (i.e., sound an alarm or
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initiate equipment shutdown if the device malfunctions) or be checked regular­
ly to verify proper operation.
Ammeters and dual level monitoring devices may also be used to give an indica­
tion of slowdown before the cutoff speed is reached. Use of ammeters alone, 
however, does not provide a positive method of detecting belt slippage because 
the meters are not always monitored and slippage is not always a direct func­
tion of motor current. Reliance upon thermal cutoffs on drive motors to shut 
down elevators in the event of belt slowdown is not considered acceptable 
because of possible long delay times before thermal limits are exceeded or 
motors that may continue to drive the head pulley without overheating [109].
If a choked leg does occur, the problem should be identified and corrected 
prior to restarting the motor. Written procedures should be developed by a 
qualified person and implemented for safe shutdown, clearing, and startup. 
Jogging drive motors may result in belt slippage and should never be attempted 
[61, 110]. Thermal protection on drive motors should not be bypassed. In
addition to checking and clearing the boot pit, the belt, buckets, and head 
need to be inspected to see if they are clear. Equipment should be checked 
for damage after it is cleared and repaired if necessary. Belt movement 
should be monitored during startup. Power to the drive motor should be cut 
off if the belt does not move or if slippage occurs. After restarting, 
equipment should be monitored for unusual noises, excessive motor loading, or 
other abnormal operating conditions.
Other potential ignition sources associated with bucket elevators, including 
overheated bearings, pulleys or belts rubbing on frame or casing, and metallic 
buckets striking the frame or casing, dictate the need for regular inspection 
and maintenance [60, 102, 109, 110]. Bearings should be located on the
outside of the leg casing. Periodic inspection is needed for proper
alignment, tension, and tracking of belts; loose or damaged buckets; adequate 
clearances between belts/buckets and casings; excessive wear on belt or 
lagging; defective belt splices; worn or defective bearings; and loose or 
slipping drive mechanisms. Inspections should be conducted at least once 
during each shift in which the equipment is operated. Adequate inspection and 
clean-out doors are needed to support this operation. Only trained and 
authorized personnel should service or operate equipment. In addition to 
scheduled inspection, workers should be instructed to report any unusual
equipment noise or defective equipment whenever it is observed. 
Instrumentation such as plug or level sensors, bearing temperature sensors, 
belt alignment sensors, and vibration sensors should be used to assist in 
early detection of equipment malfunctions [2].
Exterior bucket elevators should be provided with explosion venting to the 
outside atmosphere. Although venting does not prevent explosions, it does 
reduce the pressure buildup and helps to limit the amount of destruction 
[23]. Research conducted by Gillis [113] indicates that explosion venting can 
be used effectively to protect bucket elevators from explosions. Explosion 
venting on new bucket elevators should be accommodated in the initial design.
Venting of existing bucket elevators is not always feasible; however, it can
be provided in many applications. In the case of interior bucket elevators 
that extend through the headhouse roof, venting may be provided at the heaa of 
the elevator. Although not fully effective, this particular vent would pro­
vide relief for explosions occurring in the proximity of the elevator head. 
Guidelines for explosion venting techniques are included in NFPA 68, "Guide 




Dryers are used in many grain elevators to reduce moisture to levels low 
enough to preserve quality. A relatively small number of explosions have 
occurred in dryers; however, they are one of the most frequent causes of fires 
[1, 23]. Because of the heat generated by dryers and the high chance of
fires, location of dryers is of primary importance. Dryers should be located 
or isolated to minimize ignition potential to handling and storage areas and 
adjacent structures. Locating dryers away from the storage unit is one method 
of minimizing the risk of serious fires and explosions in the storage areas 
[23].
Necessary precautions should be taken to minimize the chance of ignition of 
grain within the dryer and, if a fire occurs, to prevent burning materials 
from entering storage or processing areas. Instrumentation is needed to 
detect excessive air stream temperatures at the inlet and outlet of the drying 
chamber and excessive product temperatures at the product discharge. Detec­
tion of excessive temperatures should result in automatic shutdown of the 
dryer, stoppage of the product flow and activation of an alarm at a constantly 
attended location. Even when equipment is working normally, operation should 
be continuously monitored by personnel.
Grain dryers are normally provided with adequate safety devices by the manu­
facturer; however, exposure to weather, moist grain, and temperature extremes 
eventually cause malfunctions. Thorough cleaning, inspection, and testing on 
a regular basis are necessary to maintain proper operation. Operation and 
maintenance should be conducted only by trained and authorized personnel. 
Personnel operating dryers should be thoroughly familiar with equipment con­
trols, gauges, and safety devices. Training should include detection of 
abnormal operating conditions and safety and contingency procedures. Mainte­
nance personnel should be instructed in inspection, cleaning, maintenance, and 
repair procedures. Proper operating and maintenance techniques should be 
obtained from the equipment manufacturer or supplier.
Additional guidelines for the design and safe operation of grain dryers, 
including provisions for rapidly unloading the dryer contents, using tempera­
ture limit controls and alarms, monitoring operation, instructing operators on 
safe operation of the dryer, and periodically inspecting and performing 
maintenance are included in NFPA 61B, "Standard for the Prevention of Fires 
and Explosions in Grain Elevators and Facilities Handling Bulk Raw 
Agricultural Commodities" [74].
3. Electrical Equipment
The need for controls on the use of electrical equipment in grain elevators 
and feed mills is reflected throughout the literature [23, 53, 60, 63, 84, 87, 
100, 102]. In addition to the electrical shock hazard, sparks or heat
produced during the normal working of switches, contact breakers, commutator 
motors, and other electrical equipment can ignite dusts. Energy available in 
electrical equipment is usually greatly in excess of the amount of energy 
required to ignite common grain dusts [23, 53, 84].
Safeguards from hazards associated with the use of electricity are included in 
29 CFR 1910 Subpart S [49]. Maintenance of equipment should be in accordance 
with manufacturers' recommendations. In areas designated as Class II,
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Divisions 1 and 2, which are hazardous because of the presence of combustible 
dust, special precautions are required. In general, equipment, and methods of 
wiring and installing equipment in Class II, Divisions 1 and 2 locations in 
grain elevators and feed mills should be (1) approved as intrinsically safe 
for that area, (2) approved for that location and atmospheric Group G, or (3) 
of a. type and design which the employer demonstrates will provide protection 
from the hazards arising from the presence of combustible grain dust. The
NFPA 70, "National Electrical Code" (Articles 500 and 502) contains design, 
installation, and maintenance guidelines for "dust-ignition-proof" equipment 
which is safe for use in Class II, Divisions 1 and 2 locations 150]. 
Equipment should be enclosed to prevent entry of dust which could ignite or 
affect performance. In addition, sparks or heat generated inside the
equipment cannot cause ignition of external layered or atmospheric dust. For
equipment that is not subject to overloading, maximum surface temperature in 
this class is 165°C (329°F). For equipment such as motors or power
transformers that may be overloaded, maximum surface temperature during normal 
operation is 120°C (248°F); maximum surface temperature during abnormal
operation is 165°C (329°). "Explosion-proof" equipment may not be acceptable 
for use in grain-handling and grain-processing areas and should not be used 
unless specifically approved for Class II locations. Equipment approved for 
Class II, Division 1 locations can be safely used in Class II, Division 2 
locations.
When possible, electrical equipment should be placed in non-Class II locations 
such as building areas other than those used for grain storage and processing, 
separate buildings adjacent to the storage and processing areas, or enclosures 
supplied with positive pressure ventilation from a source of clean air. When 
pressurized enclosures are used to obtain classification as a nonhazardous 
location, positive means should be provided to detect malfunctions of the 
pressurization equipment. Guidelines for the design of pressurized enclosures 
are contained in NFPA 496, "Standard for Purged and Pressurized Enclosures for 
Electrical Equipment in Hazardous (Classified) Locations" [115].
In addition to compliance with 29 CFR 1910 Subpart S [49], special precautions 
should be taken when using portable lighting inside of equipment. When port­
able lighting must be lowered into bins, pits, bucket elevators, or other 
equipment or enclosures containing dust, care should be taken to prevent dam­
age to the light or cord. Lighting should not be supported by the electrical
cord unless so designed for that purpose. The light should not be dropped or
struck on walls or casings. Several explosions have occurred because of
damage to portable lights lowered into equipment while it was operating [1,
83]. Equipment such as bucket elevators should not be operated while lights 
are inside so as to prevent entanglement and shorting of the light or cord. 
Lights should not be lowered into bins when materials are being withdrawn in 
order to prevent the light from being drawn into the material and becoming 
damaged. If portable lights do become entangled or caught, they should be 
disconnected from the power source before any force is applied which could 
damage the light or cord.
4. Manlifts
Manlifts are used in many facilities to provide access to the various work 
levels. Faulty equipment, lack of safety devices, and improper use of man­
lifts can cause serious injury. Workers should be instructed in the proper 
use of manlifts to ensure that they are familiar with the precautions that 
should be taken for safe operation [4, 58, 61, 116].
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Manlifts should be used for conveyance of personnel only. Transportation of 
freight, packaged goods, sacks, and other materials on manlifts should be 
avoided since it may prevent the operator from using the manlift safely. In 
addition, materials being transported may fall and injure personnel on lower 
levels. Employers are responsible for ensuring that manlifts are not used for 
freight; however, enforcement can be difficult unless other convenient means 
are provided to transfer materials between levels. Signs informing employees 
of restrictions on conveyance of materials may be effective. Carrying of hand 
tools should also be avoided on manlifts unless the tools can be adequately 
secured in pockets or tool belts. Bulky tool belts which significantly reduce 
clearances should be avoided.
Guards should be provided to prevent inadvertent contact with moving parts and 
access to floor openings by personnel other than those using the manlift. 
Other specific requirements for the construction, maintenance, inspection, and 
operation of manlifts are contained in 29 CFR 1910.68 [49]. Manlifts should 
be used only by persons authorized by the employer and trained in their use. 
Instruction should include proper techniques for entering, riding, exiting, 
starting, and stopping manlifts. Emphasis should be made to employees against 
transporting equipment and unsecured or protruding tools on manlifts. A dem­
onstration of proper operating techniques should be given at the manlift site 
and, following instruction, employees should use the manlift while being moni­
tored by the instructor.
5. Hand and Portable Power Tools
Proper selection and use of hand and portable power tools are necessary in any 
industry to minimize worker injuries. It is important to use tools properly, 
keep them in good repair, and perform periodic inspection and maintenance [51, 
52, 58, 117].
Tools should be kept in good condition and repaired or discarded when defec­
tive. Most defects can be detected visually by the user. Impact tools with 
mushroomed heads, hammers with faulty handles or loose heads, and wrenches 
with sprung jaws should be repaired or discarded. Periodic verification of 
the grounding system is necessary on electrical equipment, as well as inspec­
tion of cords and plugs for defective insulation or other damage. Employers 
and employees share the responsibility for the safe condition of tools. Regu­
lar inspection and maintenance should be performed to ensure tools are kept in 
good repair. Workers should be instructed in the proper selection and opera­
tion of tools they will be using, including any protective equipment that is 
required.
Portable power tools, when used, must comply with the requirements contained 
in 29 CFR 1910.243 [49]. Portable electrical tools must be in accordance with 
29 CFR 1910 Subpart S [49]: i.e., be equipped with a grounding conductor
terminating in ground fault circuit interrupters or a grounding-type 
attachment plug, be protected by an approved double-insulation system, or be 
used in circuits provided with ground fault circuit interrupters. Tool 
grounding system continuity should be verified at least quarterly. Checks 
should be made more often if equipment is subjected to heavy usage. 
Electrical tools with defective grounding systems, insulation, or plugs should 
not be used. Electrical tools should not be used in Class II locations unless 
dust in the work area has been cleaned up thoroughly and dust-producing 
equipment in the vicinity has been shut down.
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Pneumatically-powered equipment is frequently used in Class II locations to 
reduce the risks associated with the use of ordinary electrical tools. Pneu­
matic equipment can be used safely; however, precautions should still be taken 
to minimize airborne and layered dust in the work area since local heating or 
sparks may be generated by drill bits, grinding wheels, or other attachments 
[45]. When pneumatic power is used, care should be taken to ensure that the 
tools and associated hoses and fittings are compatible with the pressure at 
which they are being used.
Nonsparking shovels and other hand tools are used in some grain-handling and 
grain-processing facilities, although statistics indicate the degree of risk 
associated with ordinary tools is low. Cross [118] reported that available 
accident data are not statistically significant for completely addressing 
metal sparks as an ignition source. She found that high friction and continu­
ous sparking incidents could be an ignition source in some cases, but that 
additional research is needed before a determination is made of whether 
sporadic or occasiona] sparking incidents involving malfunctioning equipment 
and foreign material are a hazard. The use of nonsparking tools in confined, 
dusty locations is recommended by some sources [45, 90, 91] as a precautionary 
measure. A blanket recommendation for nonsparking tools cannot be justified.
6. Industrial Trucks
Design, maintenance, and use of fork trucks, tractors, lift trucks, motorized 
hand trucks, and other powered industrial trucks must comply with the require­
ments of 29 CFR 1910.178 [49]. Powered trucks used in Class II, Group G
locations must be designated for use in these locations and be labeled or 
marked to indicate the approval of a recognized testing laboratory.
Powered industrial trucks are frequently used in and around grain elevators 
and feed mills for unloading bulk materials from flat storage bins, rail cars 
and barges, and for other material-handling and utility purposes. Regardless 
of application, powered industrial trucks should contain appropriate 
safeguards for both the operator and other personnel. Procedures for safe 
operation, inspection, and maintenance should be established. Trucks should 
always be operated within their design capacities and perform only those 
operations for which they are intended. Overloading and operating at 
excessive speeds should be avoided. Special care is needed when operating on 
slippery, uneven, or sloped surfaces. Fueling should be accomplished only in 
designated areas. Adequate ventilation must be provided whenever powered 
industrial trucks are used within buildings and other enclosures. Only 
properly trained and authorized personnel should operate or service industrial 
trucks [51, 119-121],
Training for operators of industrial trucks should include classroom instruc­
tion, demonstrations, and practice sessions. Instruction should include iden­
tification and operation of controls and gauges, loaded and unloaded maneuver­
ing techniques, material-handling techniques, and other safe operating prac­
tices. Operating manuals and other training guidelines should be obtained 
from manufacturers or suppliers and used to develop training programs. Fol­
lowing training, personnel should demonstrate the ability to operate vehicles 
to the satisfaction of the instructor.
7. Ladders and Scaffolds
Ladders and scaffolds are frequently used for maintenance and repair
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operations in grain-handling and grain-processing facilities. Ladders are 
also commonly used for normal access between work levels and emergency escape 
routes. Accidents may be caused by climbing or descending improperly, over­
reaching, and failing to secure movable equipment. Falls from ladders and 
scaffolds frequently result in serious injuries. Instruction in the proper 
use of ladders and scaffolds is necessary to ensure that workers are familiar 
with the precautions which should be taken to prevent accidents [37, 51, 58, 
122].
Portable ladders should be structurally sound, adequately secured, and proper­
ly sized for a specific task. Both tops and bottoms should be positioned 
against solid objects and, where necessary, held, tied, or otherwise securely 
anchored to prevent slipping. Additional precautions are needed if the ladder 
is positioned where it could be struck by vehicles, doors, or other moving ob­
jects. Metal ladders should not be used where there is a possibility of con­
tacting live electrical parts. Ladders should be inspected for loose, 
cracked, or otherwise defective parts prior to use. Defective ladders should 
be conspicuously marked, repaired expeditiously, or removed to prevent inad­
vertent use. Portable ladders must meet the care and use requirements con­
tained in 29 CFR 1910.25 and .26 [49].
Devices designed to prevent uncontrolled falls are needed for fixed ladders 
over 20 feet (6 m) in unbroken length (29 CFR 1910.27) [49]. Cage guards are 
most commonly used, although safety devices which incorporate safety belts and 
friction brakes or sliding attachments are also used. Friction brakes and 
sliding attachments can provide more positive protection than cage guards; 
however, specialized training is needed for their use. Safety devices should 
not restrict use of ladders by persons with rescue or other emergency equip­
ment. Fall-protection devices are not considered mandatory by OSHA on ladders 
used exclusively as a means of egress from fires and like emergencies. Fixed 
ladders should be inspected regularly for loose, worn, or damaged parts and 
comply with the requirements in 29 CFR 1910.27 [49]. Inspection is especially 
important for emergency ladders where defects may not be noticed during normal 
operations.
Scaffolds must be designed to support at least four times the maximum load and 
be adequately secured when in use (29 CFR 1910.28) [49]. Guardrails or other 
safety devices are required where workers are exposed to falls of 10 feet (3 
m) or more (29 CFR 1910.28) [49]. Safety belts or harnesses in conjunction
with lifelines are needed for workers on suspended scaffolds or platforms. 
Lifelines should be attached to a secure point other than the scaffold. 
Scaffold decking should be secure and provide adequate traction. Scaffolds 
must be inspected for defects by a competent person at least daily when in use 
and must meet the requirements contained in 29 CFR 1910.28 [49].
8. Compressed Gas Equipment
Compressed gas is frequently used for cleaning, powering pneumatic tools, and 
for other applications in grain-handling and grain-processing facilities. 
Improper use of compressed air can be highly dangerous. Compressed air jets 
directed toward a worker's body or clothing can drive particles into the skin, 
break eardrums, or cause other serious injuries [39, 51, 58]. Respiratory and 
eye protective equipment should always be provided to prevent particles from 
entering the worker's eyes or mouth when using compressed air for cleanup.
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Equipment in the area should be shut down and other potential ignition sources 
eliminated before dislodging dust.
Caution should also be exercised when using compressed gas cylinders. Cylin­
ders should be clearly marked or color coded to identify the contents. Cylin­
ders should be protected from damage during storage and handling. Cylinders 
should be stored where they are not exposed to excessive heat or moisture, and 
flammable gases should be stored away from main buildings. Cylinder valves 
should be turned off when not in use and valve protection caps should be in 
place. Cylinders and compressed air receivers must have relief devices 
installed and meet the requirements contained in 29 CFR 1910 Subpart M [49]. 
Cylinders used in welding, cutting, or brazing must meet the additional 
requirements contained in 29 CFR 1910.252 [49]. Only trained and authorized 
persons should interface with compressed gas equipment.
9. Hoisting Equipment
Hoists and other lifting devices are frequently used for transporting heavy 
equipment and machinery. Hoists are also used for lowering personnel into 
bins for cleaning and inspection. To prevent accidents, loads should be 
secure and stable and equipment should be inspected and maintained in 
accordance with manufacturers' recommendations. Equipment should only be used 
by personnel thoroughly instructed and trained in its use [51, 58].
Equipment must be used within its rated capacity [49]. All equipment, 
including slings, cables, ropes, hooks, and other attachments should be 
visually inspected for defects prior to use. Also, brakes should be tested
before lifting. Loads should be adequately secured and balanced to prevent 
materials from becoming disengaged. Operators should verify that all 
personnel are clear of the lifting area prior to raising a load.
Design and use of hoists, cranes, derricks, and slings used to elevate
equipment must comply with the requirements of 29 CFR 1910.179, .181, and .184 
[49]. Hoists should not be used to transport personnel unless a working 
platform designed for that purpose is provided.
Additional precautions are needed when using boatswain's chairs suspended from 
hoists. When portable equipment is used, the footing should be secure. The 
boatswain's chair should be attached by four legs to obtain stability in a 
manner which ensures positive engagement. Safety belts or harnesses with 
lifelines should be provided for personnel using boatswain's chairs.
All hoisting operations should be conducted by trained personnel. Experienced 
persons should be designated to supervise the operations. Operator training 
should include instruction in proper use of the equipment including use of
brakes and other safety features. Operators should also be trained to 
recognize defective or excessively worn parts. Additional training should be 
provided when personnel may operate hoisting equipment for the purpose of 
lowering workers into bins. Methods of properly securing and balancing loads 
should be emphasized. Following instruction and training, operators should
demonstrate their ability to use the equipment to the satisfaction of the 
instructor. Periodic retraining should be accomplished.
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I. FIRE PROTECTION
1. Portable Fire Extinguishers
Portable fire extinguishers in a fully charged and operable condition must be 
provided throughout all buildings, unless employees are specifically 
instructed not to fight fires and to evacuate the facility if a fire occurs 
(29 CFR 1910.157(b)) [49]. Portable fire extinguishers provided for employee 
use must meet the requirements defined in 29 CFR 1910.157 [49] to ensure that 
the extinguishers are readily available and in good operating condition. 
Training is essential for employees required to use extinguishers and other 
fire fighting equipment since improper use can create additional hazards. 
Instruction should include the proper type of extinguishers to use on the 
different classes of fire and the proper technique to extinguish fires. Foam 
extinguishers are sometimes recommended to minimize dispersal of dust when 
fighting fires.
2. Standpipes and Hoses
Wet or dry standpipes and hoses should be installed in all areas located more 
than 75 feet above ground level in which combustible materials other than 
grain are stored [72, 74]. Dry standpipes are usually recommended to prevent 
freezing in cold weather and loss of facility water supplies if pipes rupture 
in an explosion. Standpipes should be provide with 1 1/2-inch hose lines and 
combination fog/straight stream nozzles. Where standpipes are provided, they 
must meet the requirements in 29 CFR 1910.158. [49]
3. Automatic Sprinklers
Automatic sprinkler systems are recommended in areas containing combustible 
construction or equipment [53, 72]. Where sprinkler systems are provided,
they must meet the requirements in 29 CFR 1910.159 [49].
4. Hydrants
Either public or private hydrants should be provided for fire fighting use. 
Hydrants should be supplied by an adequate water supply [74].
5. Explosion Suppression
Explosion suppression systems are available for use in areas such as bins, 
distributors, tanks, dust collectors, etc. The use of these systems should be 
considered in unusually hazardous areas (e.g. elevator legs), in dust 
collection systems, and in locations where other means of control are not 
necessarily suitable [74]. Where explosion suppression systems are provided, 
they must meet the requirements in 29 CFR 1910.160 and .162 [49].
6. Fire Fighting Operations
Initially, the contents and the extent of the fire should be determined. If 
the fire involves equipment, the general procedure should be to shut down the 
equipment, isolate the fire if possible, extinguish and remove any burning 
material, and inspect for damage before restarting the equipment.
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With dust fires, it is of critical importance to avoid extinguishing methods 
which spread or disperse the dusts into suspension. The use of water from a
hose under high pressure may throw large quantities of dust into suspension
and raise an extreme risk of explosion. Fire fighters should exercise caution
in fighting grain dust fires. Some sources recommend the use of water applied
as low pressure fog or fine mist although one case is known where this 
resulted in the dispersal of burning dust and a subsequent explosion. Until 
better extinguishing methods are developed, and where it can be done safely, 
it may be better to carefully remove burning grain and dust from the grain 
facility by using buckets and shovels and then complete the extinguishment of
the burning grain outside the facility [2, 74, 123-126].
J. FIRST AID
Prompt first aid treatment following an injury may prevent the condition from 
becoming more severe. Medical personnel, or someone currently trained in
basic first aid procedures, and an adequate supply of first aid equipment 
should be readily available to all workers. Workers should be made aware of 
how to obtain emergency medical attention.
Facilities for drenching or flushing the eyes are needed in the immediate area 
wherever there is a chance of corrosive or otherwise harmful chemicals being 
splashed into the eyes (29 CFR 1910.151) [49]. A shower should be provided 
whenever there is a chance of corrosive or otherwise harmful chemicals 
contacting a large portion of the body. Stretchers for transporting injured 
workers should also be available in the facility or through nearby fire 
departments or other emergency organizations. Basket stretchers should be
available where injured workers may have to be lifted or lowered from areas 
which are not easily accessible.
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V. NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO 
GRAIN ELEVATORS AND FEED MILLS
A. INTRODUCTION
This section addresses national, international, and consensus standards appli­
cable to grain elevators and feed mills. A cross-reference of the recommenda­
tions contained in this report to the OSHA standard is included (Table 12).
B. OSHA GENERAL INDUSTRY STANDARDS
The General Industry Safety and Health Standards (29 CFR 1910) of the Occupa­
tional Safety and Health Administration are broad-based standards [49]. As 
such, they address many areas of general safety which grain-handling and 
grain-processing facilities share with all industry. Although the general 
industry standards do not address grain elevators and feed mills specifically, 
many of the regulated areas parallel conditions in these facilities and should 
provide adequate worker protection if directly applied. These areas include 
hand and portable power tools, ladders and scaffolds, compressed gas 
equipment, man-lifts, hoisting equipment, firefighting equipment, walking and 
working areas, machine guards, and emergency planning, as well as electrical 
equipment and industrial trucks.
Other general industry standards would be considered adequate for grain eleva­
tors and feed mills with some modification. For example, regulations in 29 
CFR 1910.252 [49] are comprehensive and address most precautions necessary for 
welding in hazardous areas. However, this section does not require use of a 
written permit, which is recommended for grain elevators and feed mills.
Areas in the general industry standards either not addressed or lacking in 
sufficient coverage with respect to requirements for grain elevators and feed 
mills, where applicable, include the following:
o Protective and safety equipment. General requirements for the use of
lifelines, stretchers, and personal flotation devices should be 
addressed.
o Equipment and machinery. Specific recommendations relative to the
safe operation and use of bucket elevators, grain dryers, grinders, 
and other potentially hazardous equipment and machinery should be 
addressed.
o Isolation and lockouts. Requirements for the use of lockouts and
isolation techniques for specific applications in grain elevators and 
feed mills should be addressed.
o Confined space entry. Comprehensive regulations addressing entry into
bins and other confined spaces are needed.
o Inspection and maintenance. An overall inspection and maintenance
program should be addressed, in addition to the inspection and mainte­
nance requirements currently included in the individual subsections.
o Dust control. Comprehensive requirements for dust control should be
addressed.
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o Training. An overall training program should be addressed, in addi­
tion to the specific training requirements included in the individual 
subsection.
C. NATIONAL CONSENSUS STANDARDS
National Fire Protection Association Standards 61B and 61C address design 
practices, operating practices, and protective features for preventing fires 
and explosions in grain elevators and feed mills [74, 127]. These standards
were developed primarily as guidelines for designers and operators building 
new facilities or making major modifications. Although some operational 
considerations are included, the majority of the guidelines are design 
considerations for facilities and equipment. Many of these guidelines are 
consistent with the recommendations contained in this report.
D. INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
Alberta Province Occupational Health and Safety Regulations (Alberta, Canada) 
contain an addendum covering grain elevators and feed mills [128]. The 
regulations are brief and principally address personal protective equipment, 
scaffolding, machine guarding, and manlifts. They do not adequately address 
dust control, specific hazardous equipment used in grain elevators, or entry 
into confined spaces.
Ontario, Canada, industrial safety regulations also address grain elevators 
[129]. These regulations are equipment oriented and are very similar to NFPA 
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VI. SAFETY RESEARCH NEEDS
A. INTRODUCTION
Recommendations for research in several areas where additional study should 
prove beneficial are contained in this chapter.
B. RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Dust Control
The value of dust control in grain elevators and feed mills should be recog­
nized throughout the industry. Housekeeping is thought by many to be the most 
important factor in reducing the risks associated with secondary grain dust 
explosions. Although the value of a clean facility is recognized, there is no 
clear definition of what is meant by "clean." Some literature implies that 
anything more than a trace of dust should be cleaned up. Other literature 
indicates that accumulations should not exceed 1/64, 1/16 or 1/8 inch.
Research to determine definitive guidelines for the degree of cleanliness that 
is considered safe would be of value throughout the industry. The guidelines 
should address all surfaces where dust may accumulate, both inside and outside 
of enclosures, as well as techniques which can be used to measure the level of 
cleanliness.
Of equal importance is the need to measure airborne dust levels at grain 
transfer points and within enclosed handling and processing equipment. In 
many cases airborne dust levels exceed the lower explosive limit, even with 
air aspiration systems operating. Explosive dust concentrations, combined 
with rapidly moving components within the equipment which may provide the 
ignition source, result in a continuously hazardous operation. Although moni­
toring devices for dust concentrations [25] have been developed, additional 
testing of the device on a large scale basis with numerous types of grain 
would be desirable. This testing and the development of additional techniques 
for measuring airborne dust levels should be included as part of this effort.
A third area requiring resolution is the practice of returning dust from pneu­
matic collection systems to the grain. Many experts indicate that limiting 
réintroduction of dust improves safety. However, other experts question 
whether the safety benefits justify the economic cost and the potential prob­
lems associated with handling the dust separately. Research should be con­
ducted to determine the relative safety benefits of total restriction of 
returning dust to the grain, partial restriction, and no restriction, for the 
various sizes and types of grain-handling and grain-processing facilities. 
Research should include an investigation of the techniques that may be used to 
return dust without subsequently throwing the dust into suspension.
A fourth area needing additional study is the practice of using additives to 
reduce emissions of dust from grain during handling and processing opera­
tions. This approach shows promise; however, there appears to be very little 
positive response from within or outside the industry. The most obvious 
question to be resolved is the possibility of additives altering the taste or
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quality of the product. Additional investigation is needed to answer this 
question and other relevant aspects associated with the use of additives.
The synergistic effect between grain dust and fumigants has also been 
suggested as a factor contributing to explosions in grain elevators and feed 
mills. There is an indication from some of the research conducted that the 
minimum amount of energy required to ignite fumigated grain dust may be 
reduced due to the presence of fumigants. One of the problems with grain dust 
is there are many marginal but possible ignition sources. Additional 
investigation is needed to determine the difference in ignition energies 
between various grain dusts and dusts with fumigants added.
A detailed comparison of the grain-handling operations of the United States 
and Australia should be conducted with respect to volumes and types of grain 
handled, dust control, and equipment safety devices. This information could 
then be used to determine the feasibility of applying the operational and 
safety techniques which have proved successful in Australia to United States 
grain-handling facilities.
2. Bucket Elevators
Bucket elevators are by far the most hazardous equipment used in grain eleva­
tors and feed mills. Tests have shown that elevator legs routinely produce 
airborne dust levels exceeding the minimum explosive concentration. Although 
any location where dust is present can be hazardous under certain conditions, 
bucket elevators are exceptionally hazardous. Development of specific preven­
tive and protective measures for bucket elevators should be given high priori­
ty. Certain techniques, such as the use of slow speed legs, appear advantage­
ous and should be further developed. The advantages of using plastic buckets 
to reduce the chance of sparks should be evaluated, along with the possible 
disadvantages associated with the addition of flammable materials, the possi­
bility of static charge buildup on plastic buckets, and the possibility of 
health hazards from the burning of plastic materials. The advantages and
disadvantages of PVC versus rubber belt material should be evaluated. 
Investigation of internal dust levels with respect to the location, configura­
tion, and capacity of the dust-collection system would also be valuable. 
Other aspects of bucket elevators including basic design, reliability, and
maintainability should be investigated from a system safety standpoint. The 
possibility of removing the suspended dust should be considered. Various
safety features such as interlocks, alignment devices, speed monitors, and
choke detectors should be examined.
3. Explosion Venting
Explosion venting is frequently recommended in the literature as a method of 
limiting the destructive effects of an explosion. Venting is usually recom­
mended for bins, bucket elevators, dust collectors, pneumatic conveyors, and 
other equipment and building enclosures. However, specific recommendations 
for the configuration and type of venting best suited for the various applica­
tions (with the exception of recently completed research concerning venting of 
bucket elevators) [113] and the needed relief area are often poorly defined or 
conflicting, especially for large height-to-diameter configurations.
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The practice of extending bucket elevator casings above the root is common; 
however, most experts concede that this practice is not fully effective 
because of the rapid pressure rise rate associated with most explosions [2]. 
Recommendations for venting of storage bins also vary widely. Effective 
venting of existing concrete bins is usually not practical because of the 
large height-to-diameter ratio and lack of venting considerations in the 
initial design.
Research to determine the optimum venting configuration for each application 
would be valuable. Research should be conducted separately for new construc­
tion applications and for existing facilities. Venting should be considered 
on a large scale in new construction; i.e., the entire side of a headhouse or 
gallery. Little information is readily available on such a large vent 
configuration. Research for new construction should consider basic design 
changes in the equipment to accommodate or lessen the need for venting, as 
well as recommendations for the best location of the equipment. Research for 
existing facilities should consider the most efficient and cost-effective 
means of adding relief vents.
4. Fire Extinguishing Methods
Extreme caution must be exercised in fighting grain dust fires. It is 
important to avoid extinguishing methods which might spread or disperse the 
dust into suspension, thereby raising the risk of explosion. Effective 
methods need to be developed for extinguishing grain and grain dust fires in 
order to eliminate this risk. In addition, deep-seated fires in grain bins 
pose special problems that need to be adequately addressed by developing 
effective extinguishing methods.
5. General Safety Studies
The need for additional investigation into the various causes and controls of 
fires and explosions in grain elevators and feed mills and investigation of 
actual incidents is obvious. Not so apparent, however, is the need for 
investigation of the many accidents and injuries suffered daily by workers in 
the performance of their assigned tasks. It is known that back injuries, 
cuts, bruises, and sprains are among the most frequently occurring injuries. 
Information indicating the type of equipment most often involved in accidents 
can also be obtained to some extent. However, data of sufficient detail to 
enable the accurate identification of the contributing factors and the actual 
causes of accidents are not readily available. A system to provide these 
causative data would be a valuable aid in establishing specific safety guide­
lines and effective training programs for the entire industry.
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